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ABSTRACT 
 
Managing internationally shared rivers commonly lead to disputes among the states sharing the 
watercourse. In general, these disputes mostly relate to water allocation, equitable and reasonable 
utilization, and potential for harm. Scholars argue that all of the rules of Customary international 
water law  contradict each other and are vague. According to their points of view, this law is not 
efficient in resolving these disputes. This paper tries to prove the efficiency of these rules in 
settling these disputes because they identify the different criteria used to manage internationally 
shared watercourses. This paper contends that these rules whether substantive or procedural are 
compatible and can settle any water dispute on an equitable basis. However, the intervention of a 
third party as a neutral mediator especially international organization is important for narrowing 
the gap between disputants. To support this argument, this paper will examine the role of 
mediation in settling the Indus River dispute, and the Renaissance Dam dispute based on the 
rules of Customary international water law . This paper concludes that the rules of international 
customary law are coherent and effective in settling water disputes. The problem lies in its 
implementation, which is related to several factors. These include fact-finding, conflict of 
interest, and politicization of the dispute. It is for this reason that the intervention of a neutral 
third party, such as an international organization to act as mediator, is important in settling water 
disputes.   
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I. Introduction: 
     Fear is the common theme among states which share a river. Several factors create this 
fear: population growth, development pressures, politics, and resource mismanagement.
1
At the 
same time, the quantity of water in rivers varies considerably from season to season. This is 
exacerbated by climate change. To illustrate, according to UN Water,
2
 climate change is 
responsible for the high variability in water resources availability, inland flash floods, coastal 
flooding, and drought; thus, this has an effect on water quality and quantity.
3
 According to UN 
Water, by 2025 around 1.8 billion people will face water scarcity, and two thirds of the world 
population will live under water stress.
4
 Actually, there are 263 transboundary lakes and rivers 
that cover one half of the Earth`s land surface.
5
 These lakes and rivers account for estimated 60 
percent of global fresh water flow.
6
 Because of these facts, according to the World Research 
Institute, among 167 countries, 33 countries are expected to face extremely high water stress in 
2040; 14 countries of these are in the Middle East. 
7
 As a result of these pressures, the possibility 
of water disputes occurring have considerably increased. Most of these disputes relate to water 
allocation, water distribution, or the inequitable utilization of water.
8
   
    Customary international water law and international treaties  impose on countries sharing 
watercourses many obligations involving substantive and procedural rules which are the main 
pillars of many conventions, resolutions, and declarations. The substantive rules are based on the 
use of water in an equitable and reasonable manner without causing significant harm to the basin 
countries. This is achieved by taking into account the interests of all of these countries, and the 
right of basin states to sustainable development without invoking other substantive rules. At the 
                                                          
1
 United Nation, World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP), available at, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/water/wwap/facts-and-figures/allocating-water/ 
2
 UN-Water is the United Nations inter-agency coordination mechanism for all freshwater related issues, available at  
http://www.unwater.org/about/en/ 
3
 UN- Water, Transboundary Waters: Sharing Benefits, Sharing Responsibilities, 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.unwater.org/downloads/UNW_TRANSBOUNDARY.pdf.  
4
  UN-Water, Water Scarcity Fact Sheet, avliable at  http://www.unwater.org/publications/publications-
detail/en/c/204294/ 
5
 UN- Water, Supra note 3 at 2 (2008).  
6
 Id.  
7
 Andrew Maddocks, Robert Samuel , and Robert Samuel , Ranking the World`s Most Water – Stressed Countries in 
2014 , avaliable at http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/08/ranking-world%E2%80%99s-most-water-stressed-countries-
2040 
8
  Helga Haftendorn,  Water and International Conflict,  21 Third World Q., 1(2000).  
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same time, the procedural rules are based on obligations to cooperate in good faith and to settle 
water disputes by peaceful means.  
    Applying the substantive rules of customary international water law requires cooperation 
among basin states. Nevertheless, because of the conflict of interests in using river water, 
sometimes the disputants are not able to fully cooperate. They find problems in achieving 
equitable and reasonable utilization with no significant harm and sustainable development. Also, 
differences relations between states can play a role in hindering cooperation. As a result, 
avoiding political conflict and balancing competing interests helps in settling water dispute. Due 
to mutual mistrust between disputants, the intervention of a neutral third party can narrow the 
gap between disputants.  
This third party should be neutral and have the expertise and power to narrow this gap. 
Having a third party to act as a mediator is useful. In fact, mediation is characterized by being 
flexible in its process; in addition, it has no set of rules. Also, mediator plays an active role in 
narrowing the gap between disputants. For this reasons, states prefer mediation more than other 
diplomatic mean in resolving their international conflict in case of reaching deadlock in 
negotiation process.     
Moreover, states prefer mediation more than international adjudication in settling 
international. Actually, arbitral tribunals and international courts have limited jurisdiction 
because their jurisdiction requires the consent of all the disputants; for example, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) has jurisdiction only if the parties have signed its statute or the disputants 
agree to refer the dispute to the ICJ, article 36/1.
9
   Also, such requirement is to be fulfilled in the 
case of arbitration. However, states refuse to submit these kinds of disputes to international 
adjudication because of the authority of judges and arbitrators over disputant states and the 
parties’ inability to control the outcomes.10 To illustrate, sometimes the rules of the international 
law are uncertain; thus, the court has a duty to interpret and prove these rules which may not 
                                                          
9
 According to article 36 / 1, The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all 
matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. For 
details; Statute o f the International Court o f Justice, 24 October 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 
T.S. No. 993 at art. 36(l).  
10
 Richard Bilder, Some Limitations of Adjudication as a International Dispute Settlement Technique, 23 Va. J. Int'l 
L. 1 3 (1982); Anna Spain, Beyond Adjudication : Resolving International Resource Disputes in an Era of Climate 
Change , 30 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 358 ( 2011) 
3 
 
serve state `s argument. Also, states fear the bias of the court, especially, if the competent court 
is the ICJ.
11
  In fact, water disputes are technically very complex, thus, settling them through 
international adjudication can lead to inapplicable solutions because judges and arbitrators are 
not experts on water issues.
12
 For this reason, mediation is potentially an optimal means for 
settling water disputes.    
  This paper argues that the rules of international water law  are compatible and efficient 
for settling water disputes; the intervention of a third party to act as a mediator is important to 
narrow the gap between disputants. This paper is divided into four parts. Part II elaborates on the 
general principles of international customary law on international watercourses focusing on 
substantive and procedural rules. The substantive rules include the principles of equitable 
utilization and no significant harm, while the procedural rules include the duties to cooperate in 
good faith and settle dispute peacefully. Part III elaborates the differences between mediation 
and the other peaceful means, for example, good offices, enquiry and conciliation, and 
international adjudication; in addition, the reasons that lead states to prefer it as a peaceful mean 
in resolving their disputes.  Part IV evaluates mediation as a peaceful means for settling the 
Indus River dispute because the World Bank succeeded in settling this dispute and leaded the 
parties to sign the 1960 Indus treaty. Part V evaluates mediation as a peaceful means for settling 
the dispute over the construction of the Renaissance Dam because the parties till now have failed 
to settle the dispute in the absence of a neutral mediator. Part VI concludes that the rules of 
international customary law are coherent and effective in settling water disputes. The problem 
lies in its implementation, which is related to several problems. These include fact-finding, 
conflict of interest, and politicization of the dispute. It is for this reason that the intervention of a 
neutral third party, such as an international organization to act as mediator, is important in 
settling water disputes.   
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Richard Bilder, supra note 10 ,  at 3.  
12
  Anna Spain, supra note 10,  at 358.  
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II. The efficiency of  customary international water  law in settling water disputes: 
International customary law imposes on countries sharing watercourses a number of obligations 
involving substantive and procedural rules. These are found in many conventions, resolutions, 
and declarations.
13
 Substantive rules are based on using water in an equitable and reasonable 
manner without causing significant harm to the basin countries. This is done by taking into 
account the interests of these countries, and the right of basin states to pursue sustainable 
development without invoking other substantive rules. Procedural rules are based on obligations 
to cooperate in good faith and to settle water disputes using peaceful means.  
A fierce debate has erupted among scholars on the effectiveness of these principles. The 
base of their argument is on whether the rules of customary international water law can settle 
water disputes or not. In other words, they argue about whether the customary international water 
law can succeed in promoting a basis for the settling of water disputes. Opponents of the idea of 
the efficiency of international customary law on watercourses base their opinion on various 
factors. Weiss, Elvar, and Azarva contend determining equitable utilization and no significant 
harm is difficult in application because there it is impossible to discern which comes first; 
according to their problem, one state can argue that its usage is equitable while the other state 
can reply that this usage causes significant harm. 
14
 
                                                          
13For example, Declaration o f Madrid, Apr. 20, 1911, 24 Anne. De L'Insitute de Droit Int’l 367 (1911); 
Convention Relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power affecting More than One State and Protocol of 
Signature, signed at Geneva on 9 December 1923. League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol 36, 76. ; Resolution of the 
Use of International Non-Maritime Waters of Salzburg 11 September 1961, English translation, [1974], Y.B. Int’l 
L.COMM’N, Vol. 2, Part 2, (1976); Helsinki Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers, adopted by the 
I.L.A. at the 52nd Conference, Helsinki, Finland, Aug. 1966, reprinted in Bogdanović, S., International Law of 
water Resources: Contribution of the International Law Association (1954-200), 89 (Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague, 2001); Convention on the Protection and use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 17th 
March 1992, (entered into force Oct. 6, 1996); reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1312 (1992); 
 Declaration of the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June, 13, 1992; in 
Report on the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 
(Vol.1) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992); Convention on Cooperation for protection and sustainable use of the 
Danube River (Danube River Protection Convention), 97/825/EC available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=tru
e&treatyId=587 ; Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses-New York, 21 
May 1997, Entered into force on 17 August 2014, as an implementation of the GA.51/229, 36 I.L.M. 700 (1997).  
14
Edith Weiss, International Law For a Water- Scarse World, 7 Hague Acad. Int'l Law,26-29 (2013) ; Christina 
Carroll, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River  Basin, 12 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 288(2000); Scott 
McKenzie, Egypt`s Choice: From the Nile Basin Treaty to the Cooperative Framework Agreement, an International 
Analysis,  21 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 594-598 (2013); Hilal Elvar, Peaceful Uses of International Rivers : 
the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers Dispute, Transnational Publishers, Inc. 194-195 (2002); Jeffrey Azarva, Conflict on 
5 
 
Eliver and Abbas add that in general the international customary law of watercourses 
does not take into consideration the sustainable development need of states.
15
 According to their 
opinion, in theory, states accept limited sovereignty over transboundary resources; however, in 
practice, states cannot accept limited sovereignty over transboundary resources. They base this 
difference between theory and practice that upstream states, as first users, use river water without 
any limit. Downstream states acting as a last owner use and increasingly abuse water flow.      
Indeed, opponents
16
 agree that the only benefit of international customary law for international 
water courses is to preserve cooperation and good faith which should be done under the umbrella 
of international organizations. According to their opinion, the conflict of interest among basin 
states leads them to rely on various substantive rules which contradict each other. As a result, 
cooperation is the key to managing water disputes.     
   Proponents
17
of the effectiveness of the principles of international customary law on 
water courses argue that the determination of equitable utilization and no significant harm 
depends in general on the individual case. They add that the measurement can be found in what 
is specified in the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, 
18
which codifies the international customary law on watercourses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Nile : International Watercourse Law and the Elusive Effort to Create a Transboundary Water Regime in the 
Nile Basin, 25 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 476- 478 ( 2011).  
15
 Hilal Elvar, Supra note 14, at  458-459 ; Mohamed Abbas, Towards Hydro Political Cooperation in the Nile 
Basin: Assessment of Joint Integrated Water Resources Projects between Sudan and Ethiopia to Transform 
Conflicts, UNESCO, 24-25 (2006), Available at  http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Towards-Hydropolitical 
Cooperation.pdf; Yacob Arsano, Negotiation for a Nile Cooperation Framework Agreement, The Institute for 
Securities Studies, 8 (2011), Available at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper222.pdf;Amer, Yacob Arsano , Atta 
Battani, Osman Hamad, Magdy Hafny, & Imeru Tamrat, Sustainable Development and International Cooperation in 
the Eastern Nile Basin, 1-12 (2004), Available at  
http://www.environmentalexpert.com/Files%5C6063%5Carticles%5C4880%5CQG49K7FME36MPKWU.pdf ; 
Yacob Arsano, the Nile : A Shared Gift or a Subject of Contention ? 11-13 (2011), Available at http://www.life-
peace.org/wp-content/uploads/nr_2011_031.11-13.pdf; Yacob Arsano, Ethiopia and the Nile Dilemmas of National 
and Hydro Politics , Thesis Submitted to Zurich University, 250- 252 (2007), Available at 
http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/Ethiopia-and-the-Nile.pd; Yacob Arsano, Progress and Prospects of 
Cooperation in the Nile Basin, 1-8 (2012), Available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Africa/051012sumMari.pdf 
16
 Edith Weiss , Supra note 14, at 157- 160 ; Christina Carroll, Supra note 14, at 288; Scott McKenzie, Supra note 
14 ; Hilal Elvar, Supra note 14, at 458-459; Karlie Clemons, Hydroelectric Dams:Transboundary Environmental 
Effects and International law, 36 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 515 (2009) ; Jeffrey Azarva, Supra note 14. 
17
 Katak Malla, Current State of the Law of International Watercourses: Progress and Paradigm Shifts, 77 Nordic J. 
Int'l L. 502 – 508 ( 2008); Jutta Brunee & Stephen Toope, The Changing Nile Basin Regime : Does Law Matter?  43 
Harv. Int'l L.J. 105 (2002).    
18
 The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 13.  
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For example, the  factors which relate  to nature and  population.
19
 In addition, scholars like 
Abseno find that all the principles of international customary law on international watercourses 
should be applied together to solve conflicts over the construction of hydroelectric dams on 
international watercourses.
20
 
A.Substantive rules:  
Substantive rules are rules regarding the equitable and reasonable utilization of the waterways, 
causing no significant harm, and the right to sustainable development. They aim to attain and 
sustain utilization of shared rivers.  
1.Equitable and reasonable Utilization:  
Equitable and reasonable utilization is one of the main principles that promote a settlement of 
disputes over the utilizations of international rivers for non-navigational uses. Nationally, the 
earliest court to apply this principle was the Federal Court of Switzerland in 1898, in a decree 
concerning Zurich and Aargau cantons.
21
 The court based its decision on the equal rights of 
cantons to use the interstate river. This principle has been applied by the U.S courts concerning 
the utilization of interstate rivers, for example, in the case of Kansas v. Colorado in 1907,
22
 and 
New Jersey v. NewYork in 1931.
23
It has also been applied in many international cases, for 
example in the Indus River, Lake Lanoux,
24
 and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros project cases.
25
 
According to this principle, each state has equal rights with those of other basin states. 
Subject to article IV of the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International 
Rivers, “each basin state is entitled, within [its] territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in 
                                                          
19
  For details see , Edith Weiss, Supra note 14,  at 28 . 
20
 Mousa Abseno, How Does the Work of the ILC and the General Assembly on the Law of International Water 
Courses Contribute Toward a Legal Frame Work for the Nile Basin? University of Dundee, 110 (2009), Available at 
http://discovery.dundee.ac.uk/portal/files/1159766/Abseno_llm_2009.pdf. 
21
 Zurich v. Aargau (1898), 4 Entscheidungen des Schweizischen Bundesgerichts 34 at 37, 47, in Legal 
Aspects o f the Hydro-Electric Development o f Rivers and Lakes o f Common Interest UN Doc. E/ECE/136 
(1952) 
22
 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) 
23
 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); For details of these cases see , Yosef Yacob, Equitable Utilization 
in the Blue River Sub- Basin : Context, Problems, and Prospects, York University , Dissertation, 401- 403  (2002); 
TadesseWoldetsadik , International Watercourses Law in the Nile Basin ,  196  (2013). 
24
 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain), [1957] Int’l L. Rep. 101. 
25
 Judgment in Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project,ICJ (1998) 37 I.L.M. 162.  
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the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage system.”26This determination is also 
included in the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, article 2 (1) (c).
27
And, it is mentioned in article5 of the 1997 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
28
 
Watercourses states shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse states with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits there from , 
taking in account the interests of the watercourse states concerned , consistent 
with adequate protection of the watercourse
29
 
 
          The aim behind such a determination is to achieve the optimal utilization of rivers, 
constant with adequate protection of the watercourse. Subject to the International Law 
Commission (ILC) commentary on articles 5 and 12 of the 1997 UN Convention, the expression 
“with a view to” indicates that the attainment of optimal utilization and benefits is “the objective 
to be sought by watercourse states in utilizing an international Watercourse”30Also, the ILC 
assures that optimal utilization does not mean achieving maximum use. It means, rather, the use 
of efficient technology to control loss.
31
Thus, the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization 
aims to attain maximum possible benefit for all watercourse states when using the waters of 
rivers in order to satisfy their needs to achieve sustainable development.  
           In fact, international conventions like the 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE)
32
 and the 1997 UN Convention 
on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses
33
do not define equitable and 
reasonable utilization. However, they do both articulate different considerations in a non-
                                                          
26
Muhammad Rahman ,Principles of International Water Law : Creating Effective Transboundary Water 
Sustainable, 1  Int. J. Sustainable Society,  210 (2009); International Law Association, Berlin Conference 2004 , 
Fourth Report, 20 (2004); Available at  
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/meetings/legal_board/2010/annexes_groundwater_paper/Annex_I
V_Berlin_Rules_on_Water_Resources_ILA.pdf 
27
Convention on the Protection and use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, supra note 13.   
28
  The UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, supra note 13 
29
 Id. 
30
The International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non- Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and Resolution on Transboundary Confined Groundwater Ground,  1994 
U.N.Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 97 (1994); International Law Association, Berlin Conference 2004 , Supra note 26 
31
The International Law Commission, Supra note 30,  at 94.  
32
Supra note 13  
33
 Supra note 13.  
8 
 
exhaustive list to help define equitable and reasonable utilization.
34
In order to determine 
equitable and reasonable utilization, considerations such as the geography and hydrology of the 
basin , size of the population dependent on the waters , economic and social needs, existing 
utilization of waters, potential needs, climatic and ecological factors and the nature and 
availability of other resources are to be taken into account.  It is incorporated in articles 3, 7, 8, 
and 9 of the 1996 Mahakali River Treaty
35
 and in articles 4, 5, 6 ,and 26 of the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement.
36
 Moreover, it is stated in articles 7, 8, and 9 of the 2002 Sava River Basin 
Agreement
37
 and in article 2 (2) (c) of the 1992 UNECE Water Convention.
38
 
 Defining the equitable and reasonable utilization depends on its aim which is achieving 
equity among basin states in benefitting from the waters.
39
The International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) promotes this point in its decision on Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case and in the 
decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice, when determining the applicability of 
the Treaty of Versailles to certain navigable tributaries of the River Oder. The ICJ saw equity as 
the “all perfect equality of all riparian States in the User of the Whole of the course of the river 
and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian state in relation to the 
others.”40 In the Lake Lanoux case, the arbitral tribunal highlights equity in a straight forward 
fashion: “account must be taken of all interests, of whatsoever nature, which are liable to be 
                                                          
34
Article v of the 1966 Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, supra note 13;  article 6 of 
the 1997 UN Convention, supra note 13 ,  and article 13 of the 2004 Berlin rules, supra note 26.  
35
 Treaty Between His Majesty’s Government of Nepal And The Government of India Concerning The Integrated 
Development of the Mahakali Barrage Including Sarada Barrage, Tanakpur Barrage and Pancheshwar Project, 1996, 
available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Mahakali_Treaty-1996.pdf. 
36
 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 864 
37
 Framework Agreement of the Sava River Basin, 2002, available at 
http://www.savacommission.org/dms/docs/dokumenti/documents_publications/basic_documents/fasrb.pdf. 
38
 Supra note 13 
39
For Further see , Salman Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the 
Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law, 23 WATER RESOURCES DEV. 632  
(2007);  Yosef Yacob, Supra note 23, at 418 ; Stephen McCaffrey, The UN Convention on the Law of the Non 
Navigational Uses of International Watercourse : Prospects and Pitfalls, World Bank Technical Paper No. 25, 19 
(1997), Available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/cwc/legal/UNConvention_McCaffrey.pdf, 
Accessed on 11/1/2015  ; Owen Mcintyre, Utilization of Shared International Freshwater Resources – the Meaning 
and Role of Equity in International Water Law ,  38 Water Int'l , 112-119 (2013). 
40
 The Permanent Court of International Justice, Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the 
River Oder, Judgment No. 16, 1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, at 27 ;  Yosef Yacob, Supra note 23,  at 402 ; Joseph 
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affected by the works undertaken, even if they do not correspond to a right.”41The same can be 
concluded from principle 21 of 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
42
 and principle 2 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration.
43
 
           To conclude, equitable and reasonable utilization does not mean that each state has 
identical share of and benefits from the uses of water. It means reaching an equitable balance of 
interests for all basin states depending on a number of relevant factors.
44
Finally, it is a general 
and flexible principle enabling it to accommodate an enormous range of conditions pertaining to 
different river basins and the different types and location disputes which might arise. 
2.No significant harm 
No significant harm is the second principle of international customary law of international 
watercourses.
45
This principle is stated in many international, regional, and bilateral conventions 
and initiatives, including, for example, Declaration of Madrid article II 1911, paragraph 2 and 
3;
46
the 1961 Salzburg Resolution on the International Non-Maritime Waters article III and 
IV;
47
the 1966 Helsinki rules article X;
48
 the 1972 Stockholm Declaration principle 21;
49
 the 1992 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Water and International Lakes article 2 
paragraph c;
50
 the Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the 
Mekong River article 8; 
51
the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non- Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses article 7;
52
 and the 2004 Berlin rule article 16.
53
 
                                                          
41
Lake Lanoux Arbitration , Supra note 24, at 101, 281; Yosef Yacob, Supra note 23, at 408 ; William Griffin, The 
Use of Waters of International Darinage Basins Under Customary International Law,53 Am. J. Int'l L.62 (1959).  
42
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 16 June 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 at 1420, UN Doc. 
A/conf/48 C.R.P (1974)..   
43
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 13 June 1992, UN Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev.1, 31 I.L.M, 874 at 
876, principle 2. 
44
The ICJ adopted this approach in mention equity in general in the 1982 Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case. It 
held that it was “Equitable principles” . . . refers back to the principles and rules which may be appropriate in order 
to achieve an equitable result. Owen Mcintyre, Supra note 39 , at. 112-119,122; Muhammad Rahman, Supra note 
26,at 210. TadesseWoldetsadik , Supra note 23,  at 201; Mila Versteg, Equitable Utilization or the Right to Water? 
Legal Responses to Global Water Scarcity, 13 Tilburg Foreign L.Rev.  374 (2007).   
45
TadesseWoldetsadik ,Supra note 23, at 149. 
46
Declaration o f Madrid.supra note 13.  
47
 Resolution of the Use of International Non-Maritime Waters of Salzburg 11 September 1961,supra note 13.  
48
 The International Law Association, The Helsinki Rules, 11 (1966),  Available at 
http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/intldocs/Helsinki_Rules_with_comments.pdf  
49
 United Nations Conference on the Human  Environment, supra note 42   
50
 Supra note 13 
51
 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River, supra note 36.  
52
  Supra note 13. 
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The principle of no significant harm has also been applied  in the cases of the River Oder,
54
Lake 
Lanoux,
55
and Gabcikovo- Nagymarous Project Case.
56
 
 Under this obligation, each basin state must exercise due diligence and take all 
appropriate measures to utilize a watercourse in a way so as to not to cause significant harm to 
another basin state.
57
If significant harm occurs, depending on the nature of harm resulting from a 
water-related activity,
58
 the injured state is to take all appropriate measures to minimize this 
harm and consult with the injuring state about these measures,
59
 in light of the equitable and 
reasonable utilization principle and its factors of determination, with special regard to the vital 
requirement for human need, as it is understood to be inherently inequitable and unreasonable.
60
 
This vital needs which is closely related to ordinary uses for example drinking, cooking and 
sanitary.
61
  To illustrate, any artificial use like economic development is not considered as a vital 
need.
62
 
           The nature of the no significant harm is mentioned by the ILC in its commentary on the 
second draft of the 1997 UN Convention. It contends that this obligation is an obligation of 
conduct, not an obligation of result.
63
In other words, a basin state is considered breaching this 
rule, if it knew or ought to have known that its utilization may cause significant harm.
64
 To 
elaborate, the responsibility of a basin state can only be raised if it has intentionally or 
negligently caused significant harm to another basin state.
65
The principle of no significant harm 
is not an absolute obligation; it may be mitigated by several factors, depending on the 
circumstances of the particular case. Moreover, the harm must be significant and unreasonable, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
53
 International Law Association, Supra note 26, at 22. 
54
The Permanent Court of International Justice, Supra note 40.   
55
Lake Lanoux Arbitration, Supra note 24.    
56
 Project GabCikovo-Nagymaros , Supra note 25, at 56.  
57
 The International Law Commission, Supra note 30, at 103- 104; Stephen Mccffrey, An Assessment of the Work of 
the International Commission,  36 Nat. Resources J. 310(1996); Salman Salman, Supra note 39, at 634; Karlie 
Clemons, supra note 16, at 515 ; Jeffrey Azarva, Supra note 14, at 478;Muhammad Rahman, Supra note 26,at  211.   
58
 International Law Association, Supra note 26, at 23. 
59
 Maria Doria, the Principle of Co-operation in the Law of International Watercourses, A Thesis Submitted 
Infulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of London, 100 (2008).  
60
 Stephen Mccffrey, Supra note 57, at 311; The International Law Association, Supra note 26,  at 12, 22.  
61
 The International Law Association, Supra note 26,  at 12, 22. 
62
 The International Law Association, Supra note 26,  at 12, 22. 
63
The International Law Commission, Supra note 30, at 103- 104; Stephen Mccffrey&Mpazi Sinjela, The 1997 
United Nations Convention on International Watercourses,92 Am. J. Int'l L.at 100 ( 1998). 
64
Pacteria Wouters, An Assessment of Recent Developments in International Watercourse Law through the Prism of 
the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation, 36 Nat. Resources J. 423(1996).  
65
 The International Law Commission, Supra note 30, at  103- 104.  
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and the obligation is one of due diligence.
66
 To illustrate, this principle does not obligate state to 
prevent every harm; however, it obligates basin state not to cause significant harm to other basin 
states. Under this obligation, watercourse state should take all appropriate measures in order not 
to cause significant harm to another basin state.
67
Also, the basin state should prevent any 
activities that can involve significant risk of causing such harm.
68
 As a result, arguments may be 
raised because the application of this principle is incompatible with the application of equitable 
utilization of river water.  
          Some authors
69
maintain that no significant harm may cause a reciprocal problem; the 
injured state may rely on no significant harm, while the harming state may rely on the argument 
that its usage is equitable; as a result, the dispute will not be settled. The perspective of basin 
states differ, for example, if an underdeveloped upstream state seeks to develop its water 
resources for hydroelectric and agricultural purposes, it will rely on the equitable and reasonable 
utilization principle. On the other hand, the downstream country may take the no significant 
harm principle as an argument.
70
 
Such authors
71
argue that solving this problem is complicated due to the equivocation of 
international customary law in determining the primacy of equitable and reasonable utilization or 
no significant harm. They propose that the old draft of the 1997 UN Convention, submitted by 
the ILC in 1991 gave primacy to the principle of no harm.
72
However, article 7(2) of the final 
revision of the 1997 UN Convention, submitted by ILC in 1994, suggests the primacy of 
equitable utilization as it does not exclude the significant harm;
73
 on the contrary, it permits 
                                                          
66
 Elias Stebek, Eastern Nile at Cross Roads: Preservation and Utilization Concerns in Focus, 1 Mizan L. Rev. 50 
(2007);Joseph Dellapenna, Supra note 40, at 279.  
67
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Basin, Dissertation Submitted to Dalhousie University, 50-54 (1993).  
69
 Elias Stebek, Supra note 66, at 53; Stephen Mccaffrey, the Primacy of the Principle of Equitable Utilization in the 
1997 Watercourse Convention, 35 Can. Y.B. Int'l L. 227(1997); Karlie Clemons, Supra note 16, at 515; Salman 
Salman, Supra note 39, at 633.   
70
 Stephen McCffrey, the Contribution of the UN Convention on the Law of the Non Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourse, 1 Int  L J. Global EnvtL. Issues 250, 250 (2001); Salman Salman, Supra note 39, at 633.    
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 Itay Fischhendler, When Ambiguity in Treaty Design Becomes Destructive:a Study of Transboundary Water, 8 
Global Envtl. Pol. 111,112(2008);Jeffrey Azarva, Supra note 14, at 478; TadesseWoldetsadik , Supra note 23 ,  at 
149-150. 
72
 Stephen Mccffrey, Supra note 57, at 309;Joseph Dellapma, Supra note 39, at  279; Elias Stebek, Supra note 66, at  
49.  
73
 Mila Versteg,Supra note 44, at 376.   
12 
 
significant harm in certain circumstances.
74
 They reinforce their idea by stating that the ILC 
commentary on this version contradicts itself. According to their analysis, although it mentions 
that watercourse states should avoid causing significant harm to another watercourse state, 
equitable and reasonable utilization may involve a significant harm to another watercourse state, 
thus remains the guiding criteria in balancing interests at stake.
75
 However, the ILC commentary 
mentions that the requirement of due diligence “sets the threshold for lawful state activity;”76 as 
a result, the ILC returns back to the primacy of the principle of no harm.  These authors also 
corroborate their argument by stating that the same problem exists in the 1992 UN Convention 
on the Protection of International Watercourse and International Lakes, the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement, and the 2004 Berlin Rules.  
        Analytically, there is no clash between the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization and the principle of no significant harm. Actually, the principle of no significant harm 
is complementary to the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.
77
 According to the ILC 
commentary, the principle of no significant harm is to reach an equitable result between the 
different interests of basin states.
78
 Also, the ILA commented the same, according to its 
commentary, the harm is significant if it interferes with or prevents a reasonable use of water.
79
 
        To illustrate, according to the analysis of 1997 UN Convention article 7 paragraph 2, no 
significant harm is to be interpreted through the lens of equitable utilization.
80
Moreover, no 
significant harm is one of the determinants of equitable utilization. The 1997 UN Convention, 
Article 6 states the effect of use or uses of watercourse on other watercourses. In fact, the 
interpretation of no significant harm through the lens of equitable utilization does not mean the 
                                                          
74
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primacy of the principle of equitable utilization over the principle of no significant harm. 
According to the 1997 UN Convention Article 10 provisions, there is no inherent priority use of 
one use over other uses. This approach find its roots in the Lake Lanoux arbitration. The court 
stated that “account must be taken of all interests, of whatever nature, which are liable to be 
affected by the works undertaken, even if they do not correspond to a right.”81And, in discussing 
the division of waters of Lake Lanoux and the responsibility of France, “it could have been 
argued that the works would bring about a definite pollution of the waters of the canal or that the 
returned waters would have a chemical composition or a temperature or some other characteristic 
which could injure Spanish interest.”82 This approach is also applied by ICJ in the case of 
Gabcikovo- Nagymarous Project; the court reasoned that:  
In 1929, the Permanent Court of International Justice, with regard to navigation 
on the River Oder, stated the following:[the] community of interest in a navigable 
river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which 
are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the user of the whole course of the 
river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in 
relation to the others' 
83
 
         The ICJ also reasoned that Hungary is entitled to compensation for the damage sustained 
as a result of the diversion of the Danube, since Czechoslovakia, by putting into operation 
variant C, and Slovakia, in maintaining it in service, deprived Hungary of its rightful portion of 
the shared water resources, and exploited those resources essentially for their own benefit.  
Given the fact, however, that there have been intersecting wrongs by both parties, according to it 
“the Court wishes to observe that the issue of compensation could satisfactorily be resolved in 
the framework of an overall settlement if each of the Parties were to renounce or cancel al1 
financial claims and counter-claims.”84To conclude, the aim of these principles equitable 
utilization and no significant harm  is to achieve a balance between different uses.
85
 
 
 
                                                          
81
Lake Lanoux Arbitration, Supra note 24, at 101.   
82
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85
 Molcolm Gender, Supra note 75, at 20,26 ; Elias Stebek, Supra note 66, at 53 ; Charles Bourne, Supra note 76 ,at  
155-216. 
85
International Law Association, Supra note 26, at 15. 
14 
 
3.Sustainable Development:  
Sustainable development is part of the international customary law of watercourse designed to 
save the usage of water for future generations.
86
Although sustainable development is implied in 
the 1966 Helsinki Rules, stating the different criteria for determining the equitable utilization,
87
it 
was first incorporated in principles 4 and 6 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration.
88
 It spread then 
to  many different bilateral and international agreements , conventions and initiatives, including  
for example the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention, articles 5(1)and24.
89
 It was also recognized 
in paragraph 140of the International Court of Justice in Gabcikovo- Nagymarous Project case, 
the court stated: 
Such new norms [relating to protection of the environment] have to be taken into 
consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States 
contemplate new activities but also when continuing activities began in the past. 
This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment 
is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.
90
 
 
The application of this principle reduces distance between the notion of river water 
management,
91
 and its main objective of protecting the environment and enhancing 
development.
92
In this context, international instruments and authors have defined sustainable 
development as “development that meets the needs of the present without comprising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.”93To better understand this definition, the 
principle of the sustainable development is not an absolute principle;
94
 it is related to the other 
principles such as equitable utilization and no significant harm.
95
According to the ILC 
commentary on article 24 of the 1997 UN Convention: 
The use of terms in this article such as "sustainable development" and "rational 
and optimal utilization" is to be understood as relevant to the process of 
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management. It in no way affects the application of articles 5 and 7 which 
establish the fundamental basis for the draft articles as a whole.
96
 
 
        Actually, the main aim of connecting the three principles to one another is to obligate 
states to develop river water in ways that protect the interests of all basin states.
97
According to 
the 1992 Rio Declaration, principle3, "[t]he right to development must be fulfilled so as to 
equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”98 
This approach is also confirmed in article 5 of the Protocol on Water and Health to the 1992 
Convention on the Protection and use of Transboundary Watercourse and International 
Lakes.
99
Additionally, it is embodied in the preamble of the 2003 Convention on the Sustainable 
Development of Lake Taganyika.
100
 Furthermore, articles 3, 4, 5, and 15 of 2003 Protocol for 
Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria
101
state that the right to sustainable development is a 
right for the parties;
102
 however, each party is to take into account the interest of the other 
parties, the principle of equitable utilization and no significant harm. This vision is stated in the 
Nile Basin Initiative; with the aim being "[T]o achieve sustainable socioeconomic development 
through the equitable utilization of, and benefits from, the common Nile Basin water 
resources."
103
This principle, subject to principle 4 of Rio Declaration is "to achieve sustainable 
development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation”104 
B. Procedural rules:  
The procedural rules are imposed by the Customary international water law  on states in order to 
put the substantive rules in the application of managing shared river waters. These rules are the 
duty to cooperate and peaceful settlement which are discussed in the following section. 
 
                                                          
96
 The International Law Commission, Supra note 30,at 125.   
97
 Karlie Clemons, Supra note 16, at 507. 
98
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Supra note 43.  
99
  The 1992 Convention on the Protection and use of Transboundary Watercourse and International Lakes, United 
Nation, Supra note 26.  
100
The 2003 Convention on the Sustainable Development of Lake Taganyika, available at, 
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails?index=treaties&id=TRE-001482.  
101
EAC, Protocol for Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin, Nov. 29, 2003, available at http:// 
www.internationalwaterlaw.org/documents/regionaldocs/Lake-Victoria-Basin-2003.pdf. 
102
 The Parties of this protocol are the Republic of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania.  
103
 Ryan Stoa, the United Nations Watercourses Convention on the Dawn of Entry into Force, 47 Vand. J. Transnat'l 
L. 1358 (2014).  
104
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Supra note 43  
16 
 
1.Cooperate in good faith:  
The duty to cooperate consists of collective actions between two states or more in order to 
achieve a common progress in certain aspects.
105
 In the context of international watercourse 
management, it consists of several activities to be carried out in good faith. The aim of such 
activities is to manage the river waters to mutual benefit, for the optimal utilization and adequate 
protection of an international watercourse,
106
 to reach an equitable solution, and to reach 
sustainable development.
107
 In fact, the functions of this obligation are to ultimately implement 
the basin states obligations of equitable utilization and no significant harm. Moreover, it 
measures the degree of due diligence in preventing significant harm, and it has a role in 
eliminating this harm as well as solving disputes.
108
 It is an action to reach one goal, which is the 
optimal utilization of shared rivers.
109
 According to Special Rapporteur McCaffrey, he states 
that: 
It cannot lightly be presumed that state practice has created such a legal state of 
affairs, since this would mean that the norm of equitable utilization, in effect, 
creates dispute rather than avoiding them. There would be no legal certainty in 
respect of states use of international watercourse [..] the practice of states does 
attest to the existence of a procedural complement to the substantive norm of 
equitable utilization . Without the sharing of data and information and without 
prior notification of planned projects or new uses, the doctrine of equitable 
utilization would be of little use to states in planning their watercourse activities; 
it would be of use principally for third – party dispute settlement.110 
 
These functions can be seen in the judgment of the ICJ in the Gabcikovo- Nagymarous Project 
case. In this case, the tribunal held that the: 
The consequences of the wrongful acts of both parties will be wiped out “as far as 
possible”, if they resume their cooperation in the utilization of the shared water 
resources of the Danube, and if the multi-purpose program , in the form of a 
coordinated single unit, for the use, development and protection of the 
watercourse is implemented in an equitable and reasonable manner. What is 
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possible for the Parties to do is to reestablish cooperative administration of what 
remains of the project 
111
 
 
The duty of cooperation is a positive duty that imposes on basin states the duty to 
cooperate in order to use water resources efficiently and to protect international waters.
112
 The 
duty to cooperate requires two positive actions: to exchange data and information about the 
conditions of the international river waters regularly, and to notify other basin states any planned 
measures.
113
 
a. Obligation to exchange data and information: 
 The obligation to exchange data and information is articulated in many multilateral and bilateral 
conventions.
114
Under this obligation, basin states are obliged to exchange all relevant data about 
the conditions of the shared river water, whether quantity or quality. This information may 
include technical information for a program, plan, project or activity and the results of any 
impact assessment.
115
 Also, it may be hydrological, meteorological, hydro-geological, and 
ecological related data, or related to water quality.
116
 If one of the basin states fails to carry out 
any of this, it must make its best effort to collect and process this information.
117
 Alternatively, 
other basin states must cooperate with this state. Each state has also the right to demand from 
other basin states any such information related to the physical characteristics of a shared river.
118
 
In fact, sharing available data and information is important to the management of the 
shared rivers.
119
 Sharing this data among basin states is a means to determine their equitable and 
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reasonable utilization of a shared river so as not to cause significant harm to each other.
120
 
However, there are exemptions from exchanging available data and information. Some of these 
exemptions are related to intellectual property rights, commercial or industrial secrets, individual 
privacy, and national security.
121
 Nevertheless, basin states are obligated to cooperate in good 
faith in any circumstances so as not to invoke their obligation under the principles of equitable 
and reasonable utilization, no significant harm, sustainable development, and duty to 
cooperate,
122
as such principles aim to optimize multiple use of shared river waters and mutual 
benefit.  
b. Obligation of notification by planned measures:  
The obligation of notification by planned measures is incorporated in many international and 
bilateral conventions and agreements.
123
 This obligation is based on the effort to determine how 
to best manage shared rivers. It was deduced by the Permanent Court of International Justice 
(PCIJ) in its judgment in the case concerning the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder in 1929. The court decreed that it is "community of interests in a 
navigable river [which] becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of 
which are the perfect equality of all riparian states in the use of the whole course of the river and 
the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian in relation to the other."
124
 The 
same point was made by the arbitral court in resolving the case of Lake Lanoux. In this case, the 
court asserted that the upper-stream states should take into account the interests of other basin 
states.
125
 
  The obligation of notification by planned measures imposes on upstream and downstream 
basin states the duty to exchange data and information about the possible effect of the planned 
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measure.
126
 This planned measure can be major projects like constructing dams or programs of a 
more minor nature which can be planned and implemented by the public or private sector. Any 
planned measures which may have an effect on the condition of shared rivers basin states 
requires exchanging accurate data and information about them. This effect can be beneficial or 
adverse; however, the adverse should be significany lower than that of significant harm to avoid 
it.
127
 
The only international conventions which provide detailed procedures on the system of 
notification is 1997 UN Convention articles 11 to 19, 
128
 and the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water 
Recourses Law articles 56 to 61.
129
An analysis of other bilateral and international agreements 
and conventions,
130
 there is certain consensus among them about certain aspect of this system. 
This obligation is imposed when a riparian state intends to construct a new project in its territory, 
for example, a dam.
131
This interested state is obligated to notify the affected state or any 
competent international organization in order to fulfill this obligation. Moreover, it should 
provide the affected state with the relevant technical data and information and the results of any 
impact assessment, relating to the activity and risks involved as well as the potential harms to the 
states likely to be affected. 
132
 
If these steps do not happen, the injured state must send a notice to interested state, as 
soon as possible, to notify it of the planned measures. It should be accompanied by supporting 
documents that this planned measure has significant adverse effects. 
133
In fact, the injured state 
has the right only to determine that it is affected by the planned measures. In the case of Lake 
Lanoux ,the arbitral tribunal decreed that “a state wishing to carry out such that which will affect 
an international watercourse cannot decide whether another state interest will be affected; the 
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other state is the sole judge of that and has the right to information on the proposals.”134 
Practically, the World Bank applies this system of notification if a basin state demands funding 
to construct projects on international shared rivers; for example, this procedure was applied in 
funding three projects that involve the use of surface and ground waters shared with other 
countries. These procedures are followed in the Inland Waters Project in Croatia in 2007.
135
 
If the injured state is not satisfied with the explanations of the planning state, it may ask 
for consultation and negotiation so as to prevent water conflict.
136
In the event of failure in 
negotiation or consultation, the interested states must compensate the affected state, depending 
on the degree of the significant harm.
137
This is seen in article III/ 2 of 2015 Agreement on 
Declaration of Principles between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic 
of Ethiopia and the Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project 
(GERDP).
138
  
       The question may be raised whether the interested state may implement the planned 
measure without prior consent of the affected state or not. Another question may be raised 
whether the interested state may implement the planned measure during the period of 
consultation and negotiation or not.  
       In fact, the situation of the international and bilateral conventions and agreements is 
indifferent so that there is no international customary obligation imposed on the interested parties 
this respect. To illustrate, some of the bilateral and international agreements and convention do 
not impose an obligation on the interested basin state to obtain prior consent of the affected state 
to implement the proposed project. However, the affected basin state should demand such from 
the interested basin state, for example, as seen in article 58/ 4 of the 2004 Berlin Rules on Water 
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Resources.
139
 On the one hand, there are other bilateral and international agreements and 
conventions which do not include such point, for example, the 1992 Rio Declaration.
140
  
  On the other hand, other international /international agreements and conventions obligate 
the interested state to not implement the planned measure without the consent of the affected 
state. For example, this obligation is articulated in articles 2 and 3 of the 1923 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power affecting more than one 
State,
141
article 11 of the 1994 Danube Convention,
142
 articles V/ 2 and VI/ 2 of the 1994 Israel – 
Jordan Peace Treaty
143
 and article 14 of the 1997 UN Convention
144
. However, the expression of 
the approval is not absolute; it is limited by a period of time differing among these international 
and bilateral conventions and agreements. For example, the 1994 Israel – Jordanian Peace 
Treaty
145
 and the 1997 UN Convention mentions the period six month to respond to the notifying 
state,
146
 while 1933 Declaration Concerning the Industrial and Agricultural Use of International 
Rivers states three months.
147
 However, the 1994 Danube Convention gives one year.
148
 For this 
reason, the ILC states that a special agreement is needed to establish this point, according to 
article 13.
149
 As a result, a special agreement is needed to establish this point, in case that there is 
no international or bilateral agreement /convention binding wither the interested and affected 
state. However, there is an exception in the case of urgent implementation of program, plan, 
project, or activity , public health, public safety, or similar interests without violating to its duties 
under international law.
150
 In general, the planned measure must be, in general, consistent with 
the duties and rights of basin states under international law.
151
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      To conclude, notification of a planned measure is a reciprocal obligation which applies to 
both upstream and downstream countries because it is related to the principles of equitable 
utilization and no significant harm to reach optimal utilization of a shared river.
152
Under this 
obligation, any basin state may claim that a planned project undertaken or to be undertaken by 
another state may affect it; however, the harm should involve significant adverse effect and be 
supported by a technical document in order to facilitate exchange of information or consultation. 
If consultation and negotiation fail and there is significant harm, the interested state must 
compensate the affected states.  
2.Peaceful Settlement:  
The United Nations organization impose on countries the duty to resolve their disputes through 
peaceful means,
153
so as not to threaten international peace and security.
154
Peaceful means is 
specified in article 33 of the UN Charter, which includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, international adjudication, and any other peaceful means; moreover, the parties may 
request the intervention of the Security Council.
155
 This article is also integrated in the General 
Assembly’s Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among States of 1970.
156
These means are stated in the articles of many bilateral and 
international agreements and conventions, for example, article 12 of the 1923 Geneva 
Convention Relating the Development of Hydraulic Power Affecting More than One State,
157
  
article 9 of the 1933 Declaration Concerning the Industrial and Agricultural Use of International 
Rivers,
158
 article XXVII of the 1966 Helsinki Rules.
159
 In the context of water disputes, disputes 
mean any difference in interpretation of water treaties, any question of international law or the 
existence of any fact that may breach international obligation concerning management of shared 
rivers.
160
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In fact, mentioning any means of peaceful settlement is appropriate to water disputes, 
subject to the approval of the parties, the circumstance and the nature of the dispute.
161
 For 
example, Egypt and Ethiopia include in the 2015 Agreement on Declaration of Principles 
between the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the 
Republic of the Sudan on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Project (GERDP)
162
 in article X 
that mediation and conciliation are means to settle any disputes over the construction of GERDP 
if negotiation is reached deadlock. 
          To conclude, the substantive and procedural rules that are imposed by customary 
international water law are compatible and effective in resolving disputes. The substantive rules 
are based on using waters of a shared river in an equitable and reasonable manner without 
causing significant harm to the basin states. This done by taking into account the different 
interests of the basin states, and the right of basin states to achieve sustainable development 
without breaching other substantive rules. In fact, the different interests of the basin states are 
equal and no hierarchies among them except for vital needs which is closely related to ordinary 
uses for example drinking, cooking and sanitary. For this reason, the customary international 
water law imposes on basin states by the virtue of procedural rules to cooperate in good faith and 
settle their dispute through peaceful means. Actually, the intervention of a third party is 
important to narrow the gap between the disputants because the main problem in water disputes 
is fact- finding, which I will show later. These peaceful means can be negotiation, good offices, 
mediation, enquiry and conciliation, or international adjudication according to disputants’ 
agreement. In fact, states prefer mediation as a peaceful means to settle their water  disputes 
which I will discuss in the following part.  
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III.Mediation as a peaceful mean in settling water disputes: 
The United Nations Organization imposes on countries the duty to resolve their disputes through 
peaceful means,
163
so as not to threaten international peace and security.
164
 Peaceful means is 
specified in article 33 of the UN Charter, which includes negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, international adjudication, and any other peaceful means.
165
 This article is also 
integrated into the General Assembly`s Declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States of 1970.
166
 These means of 
peaceful settlement are also confirmed and elaborated on many international and bilateral 
treaties.
167
 In fact, negotiation is the preferable means for disputants to use it in order to identify 
a reciprocal and acceptable solution. 
168
  Interested states negotiate and consult the issues of 
conflict in order to reach common ground.
169
  If they fail to find common ground in settling their 
disputes and reached a deadlock, they may search for the intervention of a third party.
170
 In this 
chapter, I discuss mediation and the other peaceful means as specified in article 33 of the UN 
Charter that disputants can use to settle their disputes, and I will highlight the role of mediation 
in solving water disputes in comparison with other peaceful means.  
A.Mediation:  
Mediation is one peaceful mean by which the parties agree on the intervention of a third party. 
This intervention is conducted upon the request of the parties or as a result of accepting a 
proposal from the third party.
171
 This third party can be an individual, organization, or state.
172
  
                                                          
163
Article 2/3 of the UN Charter, Supra note 153. 
164
 Id. 
165
 According to article 33/ 1 of UN Charter “ [t]he parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, 
enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.” Supra note 153.  
166
 Supra note 156.    
167
 See page   
168
 Felicia Maxim , Place and  Role of  Political - Diplomatic Means Within  the  Peaceful Settlement of  
International  Disputes , 2011 Law Annals Titu Maiorescu U. 56 (2011).  
169
 Larry Bakken, International  Joint  Commission: Water Conflicts and  Disbute Resolution, 31 Hamline L. Rev. 
603  (2008) 
170
 Larry Bakken, Supra note 169, at 603. 
171
 Undala Alam , Water Retionality : Mediating the Indus Waters Treaty, Durham theses, Durham University, 98 
(1998).  
172
 Neda Zehawe, Third Party Mediation of International Disputes: Lessons From the Indus River, 14 Int'l 
Negotiation 283 (2009) ; Felicia Maxim , Supra note 168  , at 30.  
25 
 
  The mediator plays an active part during the process of mediation. It facilitates 
communication between two or more states in order to settle the dispute.
173
 Its aim is to facilitate 
negotiation and to abate or resolve the dispute.
174
 It actively participates in the conflict and 
proposes solutions. Its role also is to examine the conflict in order to reach equitable and 
reciprocal solutions.
175
 It can sometimes lead parties to sign treaties to solve their dispute 
permanently.
176
 For example, in 1987, the United Nations Environmental Program succeeded in 
leading Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe to sign agreements over the 
Zamia River.
177
    
    In fact, there are many variables that control the outcomes of the mediation process. For 
example, Zawahri and Kleiboer propose that the success of a mediator depends on the intensity 
and the nature of the dispute, and the overall relationship between disputing states.
178
 Into their 
opinion, the timing of intervention in the dispute is very important because if the dispute reaches 
a degree of complication, the mediator will fail in its efforts.
179
 The nature of the dispute also 
plays a role in solving a dispute by mediation.
180
 Disputes which are related to national security 
disputes like territorial and watercourse disputes are less likely to have successful outcomes.
181
 
Scholars like Bakken add that disputes between states which have ongoing relationship are most 
likely to settle using mediation because the existing cooperation between the states facilitate the 
role of the mediator.
182
 According to Cooper, it depends on the willingness of the disputants to 
reach a settlement and to compromise in good faith.  
The mediator is an important variable in the success or failure of mediation.
183
 Parties 
accept mediation and outcomes when they feel that the mediator is professional and trust during 
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exercising mediation process.
184
 A neutral mediator builds trust in its relation with the 
disputants.
185
 This trust is responsible for motivating disputants to settle the dispute. This trust 
depends on the qualities of the mediator, and how the mediator behaves.
186
 To reach such trust, 
the mediator must communicate with the parties equally in the mediation process. In addition, 
the mediator can focus on the common interests to narrow the gap over issues in conflicts. The 
mediator should be neutral and professional in settling the dispute. For this reason, international 
organizations are preferable as mediators to settle water disputes because they have the expertise 
to solve these disputes. Moreover, they have the technical and financial resources for solving 
such disputes.   
 In fact, mediation is an informal process that follows no set rules because it is non- 
binding in nature and depends on the consent of the parties.
187
  Its strength comes in its flexibility 
because it has no set process and structure.
188
  It does not have any direct legal basis or 
institutionalized authority.
189
   It addresses a several question to the disputants, and the issues of 
conflicts according to their view. 
190
 It can begin facilitate communication, establish fact- finding 
committees, and propose solutions.
191
 This process can be done using the carrot and stick 
approach to persuade states to change their behavior, to comprise, and to cooperate.
192
  This 
flexibility in settling disputes leads states to prefer mediation as a peaceful means over other 
forms of settlement.
193
 
         States prefer mediation as a peaceful means of settling water disputes.
194
 To illustrate, 
water disputes are technically and scientifically complex,
195
 for example, the determination of  
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the equitable utilization and no significant harm. As a result, parties hire experienced mediator to 
address the issues of the conflict and suggest an action plan to settle the dispute.
196
 Also, the 
mediator helps them to manage joint fact-finding research or funding.
197
 Also, mediation helps in 
addressing the numerosity of parties and their agendas.
198
 In fact, mediator helps parties to 
address many issues like the cost of hiring experts, and the cost of compensation. Also, the 
parties prefer mediation as the mediator can help them in sharing data and information which can 
help in building trust between the parties.
199
 Also, the disputants prefer mediation because 
mediator helps them to reach an agreement in order to establish commission to address further 
disputes. And enhance cooperation
200
  In fact, mediator promotes an “honorable escape route” 
from the political responsibility. Also, the mediator facilitates the communication between 
disputants, helping them to narrow the gap between their views, or directs the disputants to the 
solutions that may end up the conflict. Moreover, in the mediation, the parties have full control 
over the outcomes, and it reflects their local need.
201
 Actually, mediation can help in signing 
treaties, terminating disputes, and reducing immediate threat of violence. In fact, the cost of 
mediation is lower than any other alternatives because it can help in settling the dispute in early 
stage.
202
  It gives space to the disputants to interact with each other peacefully and give them 
chance to manage the conflict. 
203
     
B.Good offices:  
Good offices are another peaceful means for settling disputes. Good offices are the efforts which 
are undertaken by a third party in order to create favorable conditions that facilitate direct 
negotiation between parties.
204
 This third party can be a state or group of states or international 
organizations or several international organizations.
205
 The third party cannot participate in the 
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negotiation process; its role ends when the parties begun to negotiate.
206
 Nevertheless, it can send 
proposals to the parties as a sender and not as a negotiator. Good offices produce only an 
advisory recommendation.
207
 Mainly, good offices facilitate the resumption and continuation of 
negotiation which is similar to the aim of the mediator.
208
 However, the mediator participates in 
providing solutions to the disputes.
209
 In fact, this role leads parties to prefer mediation because 
the mediator has an active role in settling the dispute. In fact, during the negotiation process, the 
good offices may be converted into mediation upon the request of the parties.
210
 Nevertheless, 
the purpose of both good offices and mediation is to activate direct negotiations. 
211
 
C.Enquiry and Conciliation:  
Enquiry and conciliation are peaceful means for settling international disputes. Frequently, they 
are used together under one umbrella.
212
 To illustrate, enquiry can be formal by establishing a 
commission of enquiry, or it can be informal as a form of investigation and the determination of 
questions of fact by technical experts.
213
 Conciliation is similar to arbitration in process. 
Nevertheless, conciliation is a non conflictual means.
214
 Parties are directed to conciliation upon 
an agreement between them. In this agreement, the parties agree on the nominated conciliators 
and the procedures which will lead the conciliation process.
215
 The conciliators starts by 
determining the facts that have been raised in the dispute;
216
 in addition, they determine the laws 
which apply.
217
 Then, the commission follows the procedures according to the agreement of the 
parties.
218
 After the commission finished the procedure it issues a report. This report includes all 
the facts , applicable laws  and the suggested solution.
219
 These solutions are not binding and not 
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mandatory on the parties.
220
 However, the parties should ideally accept them.
221
 Although 
enquiry and conciliation is a good mean in settling disputes, they are costly mean as 
adjudication. As a result, disputants preferred mediation because it ends disputes at a primary 
stage; in addition, it is more flexible.
222
   
D. International adjudication:  
International adjudication is a formal legal means which can be either by the process of 
arbitration or the judicial settlement to reach a binding decision to resolve the dispute.
223
 
International arbitration is the oldest means of dispute settlement. It emerged in 1899 when 
twenty eight states adopted the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 
and established the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA);
 224
 however, the judicial settlement 
emerged after World War II when the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established as a 
judicial organ of the United Nations to provide judicial settlement.
225
 Indeed, the judicial 
settlement and arbitration are different. In arbitration, the parties are autonomous in choosing the 
arbitrators, establishing the procedures of arbitration, and the scope of the arbitral decision 
through the arbitral clause.
226
 Nevertheless, in judicial settlement, the parties are obligated by the 
rules of the court.  
In fact, scholars
227
 argue that states refuse to send water disputes to international 
adjudication because of the authority of judges and arbitrators over disputant states, preventing 
them from controlling the procedures and the outcomes of the decisions.
228
 Bilder and Spain add 
that in some cases the decision do not promote effective solutions for the parties, and increase 
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dispute costs and consume time.
229
 Water disputes are technically complex, and settling them by 
international adjudication can lead to inapplicable solutions because judges and arbitrators are 
not expert.
230
 Also, the international adjudication faces many challenges to promote practical 
solutions, for instance finding an appropriate and well defined source of law to resolve the 
conflict.
231
 Moreover, there are concerns about the ability of the international law to prevent 
harms and provide effective remedies because there is failure in mentioning specific standards 
for the equitable use and appreciate harm, as seen in  Cabcikovo – Nagmaros Project case.232     
To conclude, theoretically, mediation is a preferable means to solve water disputes due to 
its flexibility. States consider it as a route to narrow the gap between them when negotiation and 
consultation have reached a deadlock. However, the success of the mediator to reach an equitable 
solution depends on many variables which differ from case to case. As a result, in the following 
chapters, I examine the role of mediation in solving the Indus dispute and the Renaissance 
dispute and in proving the efficiency of customary international water law to solve water 
disputes.  
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IV.Mediation as a peaceful means in settling the Indus River Dispute: 
No armies with bombs and shellfire could devastate 
a land so thoroughly as Pakistan could be 
devastated by the simple expedient of India's 
permanently shutting off the source of waters that 
keep the fields and people of Pakistan green. 
David Lilienthal, 1951
233
 
 
In this chapter, mediation as a peaceful means used in settling the Indus River dispute is 
discussed. It chose to show how water disputes can be settled and establish rules to settle future 
water disputes. The World Bank played a significant role in resolving this dispute. This chapter 
begins with the general features of the river and the reasons for the dispute. This is followed by 
the historical background of the dispute beginning with the independence of both states until the 
signing of the Indus Treaty in1960. Then, I will display the different techniques that were  used 
by the World Bank to succeed in its role. The aim behind presenting these different techniques is 
to crystallize the role of procedure of the customary international water law in solving water 
disputes. Finally, the outcomes will be discussed.  
  A.General features of the Indus River: 
The Indus drainage basin is the twelfth largest river in the world and its delta area ranks the 
seventh in size.
234
The river originates in the Tibetan plateau in the Western Himalaya,
235
passes 
through Kashmir in Pakistan
236
to finally merge into  the Arabian Sea, south of Karachi.
237
 Its 
basin includes four states China, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
238
  In India, the basin lies in 
Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan. In Pakistan, most of 
the basin lies in the North West Frontier Province  ,in Punjab and Sind, and all provinces except 
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Balochistan.
239
 Its main tributaries from the west are the Kabul River and the Kurram River, 
while its five main tributaries from the east are Jelhum , Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej.
240
 The 
Kabul River rises in Afghanistan and flows through the Peshawar Valley to join the Indus at 
Attock. The Chenab rises in Indian Punjab and passes through Himachal Pradesh and Jammu 
before entering Pakistan. The Beas rises and flows in India ,then joins the Sutlej, which is 
considered the longest tributary.
241
 
  B.Reasons for the dispute: 
The reasons for this dispute between India and Pakistan are varied. They include the high 
variation of the entire flow of the river, the geographical nature of the river, and the 
independence of India and the creation of Pakistan.  
          One reason is based on the dramatic change of rain runoff. In fact, the flow of the river 
is highly varied. The Indus River is fed by melting ice and snow from the Himalaya glaciers and 
by Indian monsoons.
242
70 % of the total rain runoff occurs between June and September. During 
winter, the rise in the level depends upon the melting of snow.
243
Most of the water flow 
originates from India 69 % , compared to 19% from Pakistan and 12 % from Tibet.
244
 
  The geographical nature of the river represents also another cause of the dispute because 
it leads to a conflict of interests. In fact, two thirds of the Indus basin  pass through desert plains 
and the third passes through a mountainous region. This is a potential point for conflict as it 
contains good sites suitable for dam construction,
245
especially in China and 
Afghanistan.
246
However, these reasons altogether with the war going on in Afghanistan have 
caused both countries abilities to develop the river to decrease.
247
As a result, only India and 
Pakistan have been able to develop the other six tributaries Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, 
and Sutlej they share. These tributaries are considered the main source of water to Pakistan. 
248
 In 
fact, Pakistan geography depends completely on water flow coming from the upstream 
                                                          
239
 Jeremy Allouche, Supra note 236,, at 200.   
240
 Jeremy Allouche, Supra note 236, at 198.    
241
Nijim Khalil, Supra note 235.  
242
 Jeremy Allouche, Supra note 236, at 201; Uprety, K. & Salman, Salman , Legal Aspects of Sharing and 
Management of Transboundary Waters in South Asia: Preventing Conflicts and Promoting Cooperation. 56 Hydrol. 
Sci. J.643 (2011).  
243
Jeremy Allouche, Supra note 236, at 201.  
244
Jeremy Allouche, Supra note 236.  
245
 Jeremy Allouche, Supra note 236, at 198.  ; Nijim Khalil, Supra note 235, at 31.  
246
Neda Zawahri, Supra note 172, at 290.  
247
Neda Zawahri, Supra note 172, at 289. 
248
  Neda Zawahri, Supra note 172, at 290. 
33 
 
tributaries for its agricultural product, which is considered the primary source of income, and 
municipal uses of Pakistan.
249
On the other hand, India relies on many river systems, including 
for example, the Ganges-Yamuna System in the north and the Cauvery River in the south. While, 
the Indus River is the only source of water for Pakistan; for India the river is the economic 
foundation for its provinces.
250
 
Another reason for the dispute came from the partition of India and the creation of 
Pakistan.
251
The partition of India divided one set of canals between West Punjab in Pakistan, and 
East Punjab in India.
252
 The downstream western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenad are under 
Pakistan control, while the upstream rivers, Sultej, Beas, and Ravi that feed both West and East 
Punjab are under India control.
253
The partition neglected the topography, ecology, and the 
existing irrigation infrastructure based on the Indus River.
254
 During the demarcation of the new 
border between India and Pakistan, the Boundary Line Commission finds that the division of the 
water supply is problematic due to the present canal system and the high dependence of 
agriculture upon canal water.
255
This partition led to 16 water disputes between both states mainly 
related to water allocation, four incidents of which are related also to territorial and border 
matters.  
C.Historical background of the dispute from independence to the 1960 Indus Treaty: 
On July 1947, after Britain had withdrew from the subcontinent, India became independent and 
Pakistan created by the new boundaries.
256
The demarcation of the new border dividing the 
region`s extensive canal colonies and the headwork for operating Upper Bari Daab, Dipalpur and 
Eastern Grey canals , whose water Pakistan used to cultivate land, was put under Indian 
control.
257
 On August 1947, the dispute between East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) 
rose over the continuation of water supply from the Ferozepur headworks in East Punjab to the 
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UBDC West Punjab.
258
 This dispute flared up when East Punjab, being an upstream user of the 
three eastern rivers, claimed that the property rights in the waters of East Punjab`s rivers were 
vested in itself, refusing such right to the West Punjab.
259
  This claim is problematic because 
there are ten canals in Pakistan and only two in India. Furthermore, the most developed canal 
colonies, the granary of the Punjab, were in Pakistan. 
260
 On the other hand, India, as the upper 
riparian state, needed to develop its irrigation project to cultivate new farm land, while Pakistan 
needed to safeguard the existing supply for its canal.
261
 In order to resolve this issue, a number of 
official committees were formed and nominated from both countries, however, these committees 
failed to settle the issue as the parties did not agree on the valuation of the canal;
262
 moreover, 
state practice did not tackle the legality of such claim at that time.
263
 
On December 20 1947,
264
 chief engineers from West and East Punjab signed an 
agreement called the Standstill Agreement to stop water allocation,
265
 allowing discharges from 
headworks on the Upper Bari Daab canal (UBDC), the Dipalpur canal and the Bahawalpur canal 
System.
266
 This agreement was based on dividing water equally;
267
in other words, this agreement 
imposed on India the duty to allow pre-partition allocation of water of the basin up to March 31, 
1948.
268
 It also tried to reestablish the status quo prior to independence in the division and use of 
these canals. However, it proved to favor Pakistan, as it received more farm lands from the  
Punjab, and consumed more canal waters, while the largely neglected eastern Punjab belonged to 
India. Consequently, the dispute flared up because of the desire of both states to develop their 
tributaries.    
On March 31, 1948, the Standstill Agreement expired, and on April 1, 1948,
269
Indian 
East Punjab stopped the supply of Upper  Bari Daab and Dipalpur canals by cutting the flow of 
the Sultej and Ravi Rivers,
270
 without the prior consent of Pakistan.
271
 It constructed several 
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dams and canals on the Indus tributaries, including for example, the Bhakra dam, Nangal 
Barrage, Bhakra Canals, Bhakra Main Line, and Ferozepore Feeder, controlling and diverting 
waters on which Pakistan rely, without taking  in to account the fear of Pakistan from such 
designs.  This action deprived Pakistan of municipal water and hydropower. It also deprived it 
from irrigation water for 1.66 million acres of farmland, leaving millions with ruined crops.
272
 
Different proposition have been introduced for the reasons for this action. One argument 
argued that India`s action justified it on the absolute sovereignty,
273
 in the absence of rules that 
controlled water management.
274
 Other arguments narrowed this action to four possibilities; first, 
India could consider this action as a sovereign right on its tributaries.
275
 Second, this action may 
be explained as an action taken to create pressure on Pakistan to withdraw from Kashmir;
276
 in 
fact, if this possibility is right, it violates international law in this arena. International law 
prohibits any military action against civilian or natural resources in this arena because it allowed 
only actions that weaken the military power of other counter state.
277
 Third, India sought to 
demonstrate Pakistan’s dependence from India, in an attempt to force reconciliation.278 Fourth, 
the East Punjab did not approach the central government in implementing these projects.
279
 
In order to minimize Indian ability to control the waters, Pakistan did the same by 
constructing several barrages including the Ghulam Mohammad, Kotri, Gudu, and Taunsa 
barrages. Link canals, such as the Balloki-Suleimanke Link and  Bamban wala-Ravi-Bedian 
Link. Moreover, an attempt was made from Pakistan to secure the supplies of Sultej tributary and 
to prevent India from stopping the Dipalpur canal (DC). On May 3, 1948, after intensive 
negotiations, India re-opened the canal which caused the Pakistani leaders to remember their 
dependence.
280
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After the re-opening of the canals, on May 4, 1948, India and Pakistan signed an Inter-
Dominion Agreement, also known as the Delhi Agreement,
281
 covering a new arrangement for 
sharing the canals.
282
Under this agreement, India has the right to increase its consumption of the 
Indus River, and Pakistan is compelled to pay India for canal operation and water 
transportation.
283
  Equal in importance, both East and West Punjab agreed to settle the dispute on 
the basis of equal sharing of water. They agreed that for India to be in control of  a headworks, 
Pakistan’s motive was to secure the ownership of waters.284It later expressed its intent in a note 
dated 16 June, 1949 calling for “equitable apportionment of all common waters” and suggested 
turning jurisdiction of the case over to the International Court of Justice,
285
a suggestion refused 
by India.
286
 
On May 1948, Pakistan decided also to dig a channel from the section where it was 
upstream of India to safeguard water supply on the Sultej River before it reached India's 
Ferozepore Headwork, which distributes water to both states. The aim of such a project was to 
lower the waters supplies to India`s Ganga Canal Colony and the planned Bhakra Canals, which 
would lose the waters feeding East Punjab. In a response to this action, India demanded that 
Pakistan stop digging the Channel considering it a hostile action.
287
It also pointed to the 
commitment imposed by the New Delhi Agreement.  
            In December 1949, as attempts to settle this issue through negotiations failed, India 
unilaterally diverted the Sutlej River further upstream before entering Pakistan by constructing a 
barrage at Harike to divert the river directly into the Ferozepore Headwork. It was estimated that 
the reservoir of this dam would allow India to store the entire Sutlej River water.
288
In a response 
to the diversion of the Sutlej River, Pakistan decided to build new irrigation projects on three of 
the tributaries, Chenab, Indus, and Ravi, while India concentrated its irrigation projects on the 
Sutlej, Beas, and Ravi Rivers. In a direct escalation of the tension between both countries, 
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Pakistan threatened to use force to settle this dispute.
289
 In a unilateral action, in July 1950, 
Pakistan stopped in paying the fixed amount in the agreement of May 4
th
1948, and stated that 
this amount would be paid only after referring this dispute to the ICJ,
290
 the Security Council or 
any international organization.
291
Pakistan also declared the termination of the New Delhi 
Agreement because it was forced to sign it; it claimed that its signing for the agreement to save 
its existing demand from the River Sutlej.
292
Indian commented on such a declaration that this 
agreement is a reflection of goodwill and friendship, and considered part of a cooperative 
framework. 
293
During this year, communication stopped and negotiations on managing the 
waters of Indus River reached a deadlock.
294
 However, at the end of 1951, the negotiation 
resumed after both parties accepted the good offices of the World Bank.
295
 
 To sum up, from 1948 to 1952, both states competed in controlling the waters of the 
rivers by increasing the construction of hydrological infrastructure along the basin without taking 
into their account the riparian neighbor's concerns. Although both countries signed agreements to 
manage the waters of the river, they failed to implement them. 
From 1952 to 1960 the World Bank acted as a mediator, which succeeded in settling the 
dispute and to facilitate the way to lead the parties to sign the IWT.
296
 After threats by Pakistan 
to use force, the US Department of State and the World Bank worked to settle the dispute by 
providing good offices. This interference was initiated in 1952 when Pakistan complained that 
the supply of water in the tributaries and canals had been reduced and blamed its shortage for the 
threat of a widespread famine. On January 27, 1953 the Bank delivered the complaint to India 
and requested a response. After investigation, India found that Pakistan complaint was 
legitimate. Negotiations then took place between both states under the supervision of the World 
Bank. In fact, the Bank succeeded in narrowing the gap between the perspectives of both states, 
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which resulted in several bilateral agreements from 1 April 1955 to 31 March 1960
297
  ending 
with  the signing of the Indus Treaty on September 19, 1960.
298
  
On the same date, the Indus Development Fund was established to fund the development 
works envisaged in the treaty. Australia,
299
 Canada, West Germany, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, United States and World Bank contribute in total $ 893.5 million in the trust of the 
World Bank to administer this money in accordance with the treaty.
300
 In fact, the World Bank 
stipulated that India and Pakistan administrate the money according to its policies.
301
   
D.Legal dilemma before the intervention of the World Bank:   
India and Pakistan had different legal perspectives on the utilization of the entire water flow of 
the Indus River and its tributaries. In fact, prior to the independence of India and the creation of 
Pakistan, there were no boundaries between them, and the irrigation projects were constructed to 
benefit the whole subcontinent. To illustrate, the entire water flow of the Indus River and its 
tributaries was to benefit East Punjab and West Punjab.
302
 The partition of India divided one set 
of canals between West Punjab in Pakistan, and East Punjab in India.
303
 The downstream western 
rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenad were under Pakistan control, while the upstream rivers, Sultej, 
Beas, and Ravi that feed both West and East Punjab are under India control.
304
 To illustrate, the 
new demarcation has divided the region`s extensive canal colonies and the headwork for 
operating Upper Bari Daab, Dipalpur and Eastern Grey canals , whose water Pakistan used to 
cultivate land, was put under Indian control.
305
  Meanwhile, India asserted that its independence 
from Great Britain and its new boundaries with Pakistan created a new Status quo.
306
 It argued 
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that it became a sovereign state, and its natural resources were under its control as properties.
307
  
India claimed that the international law granted it as an upstream country an absolute right in 
exploring and utilizing its natural recourses.
308
 To discuss, India claimed that it can utilize the 
entire water flow of the river which was under control regardless the consequences of existing 
uses of water by Pakistan as downstream country.
309
 This new Status quo was renounced by 
Pakistan because Pakistan approved to pay money for canal operation and water transportation 
from India.
310
 By the virtue of the Inter- Dominion Agreement,
311
 Pakistan recognized India`s 
proprietary rights and it had the right to cut off Pakistan`s share of the Water.
312
  
 On the counter part, Pakistan argued that international law protects its existing use of 
water under prior allocation right.
313
 To elaborate, Pakistan claimed that the distribution of the 
entire flow of the Indus River and its tributaries cannot be affected by the new demarcation for 
many reasons.
314
 In the time of portion, India did not raise any objection over Pakistani existing 
water use of East Punjab.
315
 Also, the international law imposes on basin states to divide waters 
of shared river in an equal portion regardless of territorial boundaries.
316
 Further, the 
international law prevents any unilateral action that affects the entire water flow of shared 
river.
317
 Moreover, the unused waters of shared water should be shared equally among basin 
states.
318
 This principle is considered and applied by the Indus (Rau) Commission, in 1942, in 
deciding a dispute over the uses of water between the Sind Province and the Province of the 
Punjab. 
319
 Concerning the Inter- Dominion Agreement, it declared that it terminated the 
agreement as to protect the survival of its inhabitants
320
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E.World Bank techniques in settling the dispute:  
After David Lilienthal, the former chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), visited 
India and Pakistan for an article he was writing about the dispute, he had  recommendations for 
settling the dispute.
321
 Mr. Lilienthal noted that if this dispute were referred to the International 
Court, as Pakistan requested, it would protect Pakistan’s right. However, the decision would not 
provide an adequate solution to maintain peace or provide sufficient food for the people of the 
Indus River,
322
 especially, as both states violated their bilateral agreements and there was no state 
practice to govern the dispute. He determined also in his article that the nature of this dispute was 
not a religious or politically related problem; it was a practical engineering and business one.
323
 
In his article, he mentioned that politics and heightened emotions increased the tension between 
both parties although the dispute was completely related to technical irrigation issues.
324
 He also 
elaborated that the technical problem involved the way both states may use the water by 
constructing a shared irrigation project.
325
 He also proposed the establishment of a joint 
management system operating the Indus Basin to reinforce cooperation between the two 
states.
326
Given the strength of his contentions, the World Bank tried to adopt his 
recommendations, amending them subject to the variable circumstances of the dispute.   
  The World Bank used several techniques to settle the dispute. Some highlights the 
importance of third party involvement in resolving water disputes in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement. These techniques crystallize the role of a third party in the interpretation of 
agreements in case of mistrust between parties. The following section discusses the different 
techniques the World Bank that used to settle this dispute and lead the parties to sign the 1960 
IWT, as to be the basis of resoling any water dispute until now:  
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1. Establishing flexible  settlement principles :  
The first technique the World Bank was to discuss the principles that would be used as the basis 
for settling the dispute. The president of the World Bank corresponded with the leaders of both 
states, stating the key principles for resolving the conflict.
327
 The first principle was that the 
water in the Indus River was enough for both countries.
328
 The second  principle was that the 
Sutlej River is to be treated as a single unit and all rivers are to be discussed separately.
329
 The 
third principle involves the negotiations, stating that they were to be based on technical 
arguments and not on political views.
330
 As a means of evaluating of these propositions, the 
three principles allowed the participants, including the World Bank and the disputants, to 
interpret them, each in their own way. They also embody the right of both states in developing 
the waters of the Indus in order to satisfy their needs for water.  
2. Establishing a fact- finding committee: 
The second technique the World Bank was used to establish a fact finding committee as to 
measure the needed and available water for both states. On May 25 1952, an ad hoc committee 
comprised from Indian and Pakistani engineers plus a World Bank team   to develop an outline 
for Indus River basin water management schemes.
331
 This task force suggested that the total 
supply might be divided by catchment and use.
332
This task force also determined how to 
calculate the water requirements of cultivated irrigable areas in each country. Equally important, 
the task force highlighted the importance of data and survey exchange, as requested by both 
states.  The task force determined that cost estimates were to be calculated and a standardized 
schedule was to be set forth to execute a new project.
333
 
3. Facilitating negotiations in order to sign temporary agreements:  
The third technique the World Bank used to facilitate negotiation between the disputants was to 
establish the points of conflict and narrow the gap between them permanently.  
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         In November 1952 in Karachi and in 1953 in Delhi, both states failed to achieve a 
common plan to develop the Indus River.
334
 As a result, the World Bank requested each of the 
states` delegations to set up its own plans in order to determine the outstanding issues causing 
controversy between both parties.   
 On October 6
th
  1953 a Pakistani consultant engineer named Tipton who was appointed 
from the World Bank tried to evaluate the action plan of the both states.
335
 Tipton stated in his 
report  that both states agreed upon the supplies available for irrigation;
336
 however, they differed 
on how these supplies would be allocated.
337
 Each state preferred its own use over the other’s, as 
their estimate of available water within the basin was similar.
338
 They also agreed on the 
allocation of water between them and recognized Indian`s right to use waters coming from 
eastern rivers. However, they deprived each other of allocation for planned uses and future 
development.
339
 Tipton suggested in his report the pooling together of all the water of the basin 
and then allocating it.
340
 This suggestion was rejected by the parties.  
The World Bank found that the margin of difference remained wide;
341
 consequently, the 
Bank tried to narrow this gap.
342
 This became more obvious in the numerous complaints filed 
against each other concerning the exchanging of data about existing projects and the shortage of 
water.
343
 At this point, the Bank realized that “the problem could not be solved solely by 
technicians; the Bank would, positively, have to negotiate according to a strategy or strategies of 
its own".
344
 Thus, the Bank notified both parties that "[t]he proposed plan [would] not fully 
satisfy either side",
345
 however, it pointed that "[n]o plan could do that; there [was] not enough 
water to fulfill all demands"
346
  In fact, the World Bank announced that after the technical 
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committee failed to apportion waters between the two states because of their conflict of 
interest.
347
   
After such a determination, in 1954 the World Bank proposed having the entire flow of 
the eastern rivers Ravi, Sultej, and Beas Rivers allocated to India,
348
 and all the western rivers 
Jhelum, Chenab, and Indus Rivers with the exception of a small amount of the Jhelum River  
used in Kashmir allocated to Pakistan.
349
 According to the proposal, both sides would agree to a 
transition period during which Pakistan would complete link canals dividing the watershed, 
while India continued to allow Pakistan historic use of water from the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej 
rivers.
350
 The Bank formulated the basis for solving the dispute for the existing and future usage. 
Aftewards , the World Bank notified  the parties of its benefits:  
 [h]owever, the plan would bring great benefits. It would protect existing 
irrigation and would permit, and even stimulate, substantial future development. 
Most important of all, by providing a fair, understandable and definitive division 
of waters, it would eliminate a point of serious friction between the two 
countries
351
 
 
India quickly accepted the proposal in March 1954;
352
it tried to show that this acceptance 
was a final sacrifice on its part to solve the dispute.  India replied to the World Bank that          
“in the interest of a speedy and constructive settlement and in the spirit of goodwill and 
friendship that has guided [its] Government ever since the beginning of this controversy, [it 
accepts] the principles of the Bank Proposal as the basis of agreement."
353
 However, it stated, 
expressing that this acceptance was to be considered its final attempt to settle this conflict, 
The Bank Proposal requires India to give up the use of a large part of the waters 
flowing through her own territory and thus to abandon, for all time, any hope of 
the development of a considerable portion of the extensive arid lands in India 
which has no possible source of water supply other than the Indus system of 
rivers and which will therefore remain a desert forever. Its acceptance would 
also imply a very heavy financial burden for my Government; not only would it 
involve the payment of large sums of money to Pakistan, but would also make 
new developments in India much more expensive than if all the waters running 
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through her territory and indispensable for her normal development could have 
been utilised therein 
354
 
 
On the other hand, Pakistan`s response was a flat out rejection of the proposed plan. The 
proposed plan would not provide enough water for its needs, as under the proposed plan it would 
not be able to execute new projects to meet its water needs due to the potential economic and 
political instability. 
          In response to Pakistan`s refusal, the World Bank continued its role as a mediator to settle 
the dispute over water allocation. The World Bank, in its written memo to both parties, suggested 
four approaches, including “[i] to use the Lilienthal approach. [ii] to consider the Bank's 
February 1954 proposal - rejected, and therefore start "horse-trading" with the supplies of the 
eastern rivers. [iii] to use the Tipton study and [iv] to start work on other aspects of the Indus 
Basin dispute, such as the canals and cost, leaving the principle of division until later”355On May 
26 1956 , the World Bank tried to safeguard Pakistan’s concerns and issued another Aide 
Memoire ,
356
 according to which:  
The Bank [would continue] to hold the view that the division of the waters 
contemplated by the Bank Proposal of February 1954 [afforded] the best 
prospects for a settlement of the Indus Waters question; that out of the flow-cum-
storage potential of the rivers allocated to them, India and Pakistan could each 
develop very substantial irrigation uses, additional to those that they now 
[enjoyed]; and that no insuperable engineering difficulties [were] likely to arise 
in either country in constructing the physical works necessary to develop these 
additional supplies. The works would, however, be costly; and their financing  
would present a serious financial problem.
357
 
 
  In response, Pakistan tried to persuade the World Bank to finance the most essential 
storage facilities sidelined by the 1954 plan, which was in need of an amendment in light of the 
1956 aide memories.
358
 
  After a long discussion under World Bank supervision between 1 April 1955 to 31 
March 1960, many ad hoc agreements were signed to settle the dispute, except for  the period 
from 1 October 1957 to 30
th
September 1958,
359
 during which the parties were unable to agree. 
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According to these agreements, India agreed to provide Pakistan with water for a specified 
period and specific quantity in a year.
360
 
4. Using the carrot and stick approach to put permanent basis over river waters 
management :  
The third technique the World Bank was used to the carrot and stick approach to lead parties to 
accept gains and losses. Before beginning the mediation process, both India and Pakistan found 
themselves having no common ground to safeguard the water supplies from the Sutlej River.
361
 
They found that the Delhi Agreement did not promote any solution to the dispute;
362
  it was only 
a mere “acknowledgement that there was a dispute in which both sides had legitimate claims”363 
Due to this fact, Pakistan feared from any abuse of its existing status as a downstream, so it 
breached the Delhi Agreement.
364
 In response, India described this action as a unilateral 
termination of the agreement.
365
 To protect their interests, as there was not enough funding 
means for any suitable irrigation project, both countries approached the World Bank to fund an 
irrigation project on this river.  Only then, the World Bank understand that Pakistan and India 
might accept its good offices and it was good time to send Lilienthal`s recommendation to both 
parties. This was a good time for the Pakistani side, as it was motivated by a desire to secure 
agreements that ensured water supply to its existing usage.
366
 It was also a good time for the 
Indian party, as it was also motivated by its desire to secure its need from water for development 
by signing an agreement based on equitable apportionment of the waters. 
367
In response, the 
World Bank refused to finance the development projects of either state, due to the political 
tension existing between them; however, the Bank was more interested in funding India`s 
Project.
368
 The World Bank wrote to Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Nehru to accept the 
good offices of the Bank in light of  the Lilienthal proposal and to accept funding for their 
integrated infrastructure. According to the World Bank proposal:  
(a) The Bank and Pakistan agreed on the system of replacement works to be 
constructed in Pakistan, one of the purposes of this system to be the feeding of 
the canals which were dependent on the eastern rivers with waters of the 
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western rivers. India would have no part in the conception, construction or the 
administration of the replacement works in Pakistan. (b) The Bank and India 
agreed on the financial participation of India in the works to be constructed in 
Pakistan. (c) The transition period was set at ten years. The Indian Union 
accepted this on the condition that she would progressively with- draw the 
waters of the eastern rivers for use in India. The Bank also agreed to provide 
foreign exchange to India for the construction of the reservoir to be 
constructed on the Beas. (d) The transition period could be extended at the 
request of Pakistan by one to three years. The annual financial contribution by 
India was to be reduced in proportion to the period thus ex- tended. (e) 
Pakistan accepted certain uses by India in the upper reaches of the western 
rivers before they entered into Pakistan.
369
 
 
    In fact, India gained more legitimacy to its perspective with the interference of the 
World Bank, as it continued controlling the eastern rivers, while Pakistan controlled the western 
rivers. However, both countries received over 1000 million US dollars in 1960 as a form of 
financial aid for irrigation projects.
370
 These projects were based on a comprehensive unified 
plan aiming to safeguarding long-term water supply.
371
 Moreover, the World Bank offered 
economic incentives to Pakistan by agreeing to finance new projects to afford waters to Pakistan 
through  suitable funds and technical know-how by the negotiators to realize its present position 
and requirements.
372
 The plan not only promised to help fit in the construction of the distribution 
system and the linking of canals, but also a much needed electricity supply for its future.
373
 This 
plan is considered the basis for the 1960 Indus River Agreement.   
E. Outcomes:  
The World Bank succeeded in resolving this dispute over managing one shared river. It also 
succeeded in leading the parties to conclude a permanent treaty in the 1960 Indus Treaty which 
has survived spite of bitter political relations including three armed conflicts between the two 
countries. 
374
 This treaty is considered to be a remarkable example of the successful resolution of 
conflict and a landmark in the role of the World Bank as an international mediator.
375
 
                                                          
369
IBRD-8/5/54 as cited in Tufail Jawed,  Supra note 325, at 43 
370
 Undala Alam, Supra note 249, at 346-347 
371
 Undala Alam, Supra note 249, at 346-347 
372
 Raja Nazakat, Supra note 255, at 95 ; Neda Zawahri, Supra note 172, at 295.  
373
 Raja Nazakat, Supra note 255, at 101. 
374
 Raja Nazakat, Supra note 255, at 7. 
375
 Mikiyasu Nakayama, Success and Failures of International Organizations in Dealing With International Waters, 
13 Int'l J. Water Res. Develop.,368 (1997), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07900629749737 
47 
 
In fact, the mechanism for distributing water in this dispute shows a practical 
compatibility between the substantive and procedural rules of international customary law in 
settling water disputes. Although the actual allocation of water was not equal - 80 % for Pakistan 
and 20 % for India-, this distribution was deemed equitable based on needs, prior use, and other 
considerations. The World Bank reached such a determination after establishing a committee of 
engineers from both countries and demanding action plans from the parties. Then, the Bank 
proposed its own plan and narrowed the gap between the perspectives of the two states. The 
Bank based new principles, at this time equitable utilization and no significant harm through its 
intervention which become the main pillar in settling water disputes.  
The Bank also succeeded in maintaining such a distribution by relaxing the tension 
between the riparian states and encouraging interdependence which demanded active 
cooperation. The World Bank succeeded in doing so by pursuing two strategies. The first 
strategy was to lead the parties to conclude an agreement which imposed interdependent and 
interrelated commitments. Although, the Indus treaty allocated the waters of the river between 
the two states, the treaty  lead the parties to depend on each other in developing the river and 
satisfying their own needs. According to article III of the treaty and Annexures E and C, India 
can use the western tributaries in generating hydropower, satisfying its own water needs for 
agriculture, developing the tributaries for navigation, and the floating of timber and fishing.
376
 
On the other hand, according to article II, Annexure B, Pakistan has the right to use the eastern 
tributaries given to India.
377
 Pakistan also depended on India for the delivery of hydrological and 
metrological data. However, according to article IV /  4,5, 8 , India depends on Pakistan to 
dismiss its agriculture run off and any excess, flood or unused water. To illustrate, if Pakistan 
refuses to accept water from India, it can result in flooding in upstream “India”.378This 
cooperative relationship has contributed to a massive infrastructure development in the Indus 
River Valley. For example, this is seen in the construction of  link of canals, barrages, and new 
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reservoirs to replace the waters of the Beas , Sultej, and Ravi Rivers which were allocated by the 
treaty to India.
379
 
The second strategy of the World Bank was to enact articles in the treaty that obligate the 
parties to establish a commission. This commission is to facilitate direct communication which 
helps in exchanging hydrological data and scheduling work maintenance. It also facilitates 
regular meeting which smooth negotiations on how the parties can implement treaties and 
discuss construction projects. In addition, it helps in monitoring the existing use by the riparian 
states confirming the accuracy of exchanged data. Moreover, it considers an effective mechanism 
in settling disputes over managing the river. For example, this Commission in 1965 succeeded in 
releasing the tension between the two states during their war over Kashmir
380
because of the 
nature of the obligation which had been imposed on the two states and the role of the 
Commission in resolving conflicts. Also, this Commission succeeded in negotiating many issues 
between the two states from 1970 to 2007. For example, it negotiated the amount of agricultural 
lands which are irrigated from the western tributaries and negotiated the nature of flood warning 
devices that are directed towards Pakistan.
381
 
In fact, the World Bank succeeded in its role because it put the interest of the two parties 
in full view; also, its impartiality and neutrality exercised its role leading the parties to sign and 
accept the outcomes of its intervention. For example, the World Bank failed as a mediator in 
solving India`s and Bangladesh`s dispute over the Ganges River because its approach in solving 
the dispute was the same as Bangladesh.
382
 
To sum up, the World Bank succeeded in its role because it had the expertise, trust, and 
funds to finance any solution that would have been difficult because of a lack of funding. In 
addition, the World Bank played a great role in narrowing the gap between the disputants over 
the utilization of the Indus River and its tributaries.  
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V.Mediation as a peaceful mean in settling  the Renaissance Dam dispute : 
 
In this chapter, I will evaluate mediation as a peaceful means in settling the dispute between 
Egypt and Ethiopia over the construction of the Renaissance dam. For the purpose of the 
evaluation, I will analyze the various different reasons that led to this dispute, and I will explain 
the negotiation process. Then, I will explore the possible obstacles, which may face mediation as 
a peaceful means in settling this dispute. After such, I will recommend a possible solution. 
During this process, I will take into my consideration the facts, the reasons for the dispute, and 
the relationship between these two countries. 
A.General  features of the Nile River:  
The Nile River is considered the longest river in the world; it is of 6,825 Kilometers long. Its 
catchment basin covers 3,390,000 square kilometers, and its basin includes eleven states. Eight 
states are upstream countries: Ethiopia, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya , 
Rwanda , Uganda , Tanzania , and Eriteria; three states are downstream countries: Egypt , Sudan 
, and South Sudan. Five of these countries are the poorest countries in the world. The two main 
sources of water of the Nile River are rainflow in the Ethiopian Highlands and equatorial lakes 
such as Lake Victoria. The two main tributaries are the White River and the Blue River, the 
White River rises from the Great Lakes Region in central Africa with the most distant source in 
central Burundi, while the Blue River starts at Lake Tana in Ethiopia and flows into the Sudan 
from the southeast.  Both rivers come together near the Sudanese capital of Khartoum to form 
the main Nile River.
383
 
B.Reasons for conflict  between Egypt and  Ethiopia:  
The dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia over construction of the dam can be traced to the 
features of the dam which involve physical risks to Egypt, the conflict of interest over the project 
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itself, and water scarcity. Actually, the dispute is complicated by the factual and legal 
circumstances surrounding this dispute, which I will discuss.   
1.The feature of the dam involves risks to Egypt: 
The Dam is constructed over the Blue Nile River, which represents 59 to 68 percent of the 
annual water contribution to the Nile River, which flows to the downstream countries, Egypt and 
Sudan.
384
 According to the Ethiopian Government, this Dam is being constructed to generate 
electricity, estimated at 6,000 MW with the expected average energy production of more than 
15,000 GWh.
385
 According to the announcement of the Ethiopian Government,“- [t]he project 
comprises of mainly ;-Roller Compacted Concrete RCC Dam, Saddle Dam , Two Power houses , 
a 500 KV switch yard and a spill way.”386To that end, a reservoir will be constructed with a 
capacity of about 74 Billion Cubic Meters (BCM) at the full supply level, out of 200 BCM of the 
water available in the Nile River that is directed to downstream countries.
387
  It covers an area of 
1.680 square kilometers of forest in Northwest Ethiopia with a depth of 15 m.
388
 The 
International River Networks 
389
 state that the area of the reservoir is about four times the size of 
Cairo.
390
 The volume of the reservoir is twice that of Lake Tana which is considered the largest 
lake in Ethiopia and source of the Blue River.
391
 In addition, Egypt has a concern on the first 
filling.
392
Consequently, Egypt claims that if the reservoir is constructed with this feature, Egypt 
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will incur significant harm. For instance, the Dam will reduce the average water that flows to the 
High Aswan Dam to a maximum of 47 % during years of drought.
393
 Consequently, its ability to 
produce electricity will decrease. The massive weight of water and sediments in the dam`s 
reservoir may cause earthquakes because the nature of the soil is fragile in this place.
394
 Also, 
any structural failure in the dam means catastrophe for Egypt because floods could be result 
affect Egyptian High Dam.
395
 However, Ethiopia argues that such Dam helps to achieve 
sustainable development and announced that the project will be completed by July 2017.
396
 As a 
result, a dispute was flared up about the features of such a project between Egypt and Ethiopia.  
2.Conflicts of interest over this project:  
Indeed, there is a conflict of interest over this project because Ethiopia considers this project 
necessary for development. Egypt also needs the water for life and development describing it as 
a national security. The project reflects the Ethiopian government`s ambitions to transform the 
economy, develop the country, eradicate poverty, and achieve the UN Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs).  
 The Ethiopian Government considers this project as part of a broader scheme to expand 
its hydroelectric power capacity 
397
 and the means to achieve sustainable development. The 
population is expected to reach 107 million in 2025.
398
And, five million Ethiopians currently 
need food aid, while 14 million other Ethiopian citizens rely on handouts.
399
To demonstrate, the 
agriculture sector is over 40 percent of Ethiopia`s GDP and has earnings of 90 % of Ethiopia`s 
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foreign currency.
400
 After the construction of the Dam, the cultivated area will increase by 
500,000 hectares and will provide water for irrigation during the drought seasons by controlling 
the flow of water.
401
 Thus, such a Dam is the means by which the Ethiopian government can 
combat poverty, and provide food to its citizens. According to the official website of the 
Ethiopian Electric Power Cooperation (EEPCO), this project will provide numerous job 
opportunities for Ethiopian citizens; for instance, the project will provide an opportunity to have 
a fishery resulting from the reservoir.
402
 Another benefit to Ethiopia from the construction of the 
Dam is the opportunity for an estimated 50 percent of the Ethiopian citizens to have access to 
clean and cheap electricity.
403
 Furthermore, it will increase the flow of foreign currency, which is 
estimated to be 27 million dollars a day revenue
404
 by exporting produced electricity to its 
neighbors like Kenya, Djibouti, Sudan and South Sudan, who suffer from electricity shortages.
405
 
In general, after the construction of the Dam, Ethiopia will be the second highest generator of 
power in Africa after the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
406
 Consequently, the Ethiopian 
government considers this project as essential for national security.  
 On the other side, Egypt is completely dependent on the Nile River. It has provided 90 % 
of Egyptian freshwater resources since ancient times, and 90 percent of its population live 
currently along its banks.
407
 Egypt suffers from high population growth; it is estimated to be 120 
to 150 million by 2050.
408
In fact, the Nile River is very important for agriculture and 
hydroelectrical power. In terms of agriculture, 85 percent out of 55.5 bcm reaching Egypt is used 
in irrigating 3.42 million hectares of Egypt crop Lands.
409
 The agricultural activities provide 
employment for 35 percent of the labour force and contribute up to 13.5 per cent of the country's 
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GDP.
410
 However, according to a new report issued by the Ministry of Water Resources and 
Irrigation, agriculture makes up 40 percent of country`s GDP.
411
As for hydroelectric power, 
according to the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company's 2012 report, freshwater coming from 
the Nile River, contributes up to 8.2 percent of generated power, while the thermal power 
contributes 90 percent.
412
Due to the Egyptian reliance on the thermal power will decrease 
because of the shortage of fuel;
413
 as a result, Egypt will directly rely on water, wind, and sun to 
generate electricity. Consequently, any shortage in water supply will lead to critical problems for 
the Egyptian government, especially as water availability in Egypt is below the water poverty 
line.
414
 Indeed, by 2017, Egypt will need more than 20 bcm.
415
Because of these facts, the Nile 
River is essential for Egypt. It is what led Anwar El Sadat to claim in 1979 that “the only matter 
that could take Egypt to war again is water.”416 Even during Morsi`s presidency, this statement 
was repeated by politicians during their meetings with him.  
3.Scarcity of water in the Nile River:   
One of the major reasons for the dispute is the scarcity of water in the Nile River which is 
increases the complexity of the dispute.  It is based on two factors, the amount of water in the 
Nile River is limited in comparison to the demands of people for the water itself and 
hydroelectric power, and climate change has decreased the amount of water available. The Nile 
River has only 6.5 percent of water, compared to the Congo River and 3 percent of the Amazon 
River, the second longest river in the world.
417
 The reason is because the flow of the Nile River 
is highly variable from season to season, and there is no tributary or in flow for the last 3,000 
Kilometers before its draining in the Mediterranean Sea.
418
 Furthermore, the population of the 
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Nile Basin is increasing rapidly; according to the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI),
419
 the population of 
Nile countries in 2012 is estimated with to be 437 million, with 238 million residing in the Nile 
Basin.
420
 In the next 25 years, the population of the Nile basins is expected to reach 600 million 
people.
421
 In addition to population growth, more than half of the Nile Basin countries get 90 % 
of their electricity from hydropower.
422
This means that the percentage of water loss increases 
due to water storage in the reservoirs. Climate change also increases the probability of water 
scarcity.
423
 In addition to population growth, more than half of the Nile Basin countries get 90 % 
of their electricity from hydropower.
424
 This means that the percentage of water loss increases 
due to water storage in the reservoirs. Climate change also increases the probability of water 
scarcity.
425
  
C.Legal dilemma behind the construction of the Dam:  
Both Egypt and Ethiopia have different legal perspectives towards managing the Nile River. 
Egypt insists on its historical and acquired right which is its consent on any project that may 
affect the flow of the Nile River.
426
 Egypt insists on its receiving fixed amount of water of 55.5 
bcm by virtue of the 1959 agreement.
427
 
 Egypt argues that it has a historical right to veto power on rejecting any proposed 
planned measure.
428
 Egypt argues that upstream countries should obtain its consent to construct 
any water project.
429
 It bases its argument on numerous agreements which were signed during 
                                                          
419The Nile Basin Initiative “is an intergovernmental partnership of ten Nile riparian countries that is seeking to 
manage and develop the common Nile water resources in a cooperative manner and promote regional peace and 
security.” The Nile Basin Initiative , State of the Nile River Basin , 18 (2012), Available at 
http://www.cedare.int/namcow/attachments/article/141/State%20of%20the%20Nile%20River%20Basin.pdf , 
Accessed on 3/4/2014  
420
 The Nile Basin Initiative, Supra note 419, at 100  
421
Scott McKenzie, Supra note 14 , at 576. 
422
 Scott McKenzie, Supra note 14, at 575. 
423
Micheal Hammnd , Supra note 397.  
424
  Scott McKenzie, Supra note 14 , at 575.  
425
 Micheal Hammnd , Supra note 397.  
426
 A list of conventions that concluded over managing the Nile River is summarized by Dante Capohera, Legal 
Aspects of Transboundary River Basins in the Middle East: : the Al Asi (Orontes), the Jordan, and the Nile, 33 Nat. 
Resources J. 657( 1993).  
427
 Agreement between the Republic of the Sudan and the United Arab Republic of Egypt for the Full Utilization of 
the Nile Waters, Cairo, 8 Nov., 1959, 453 UNTS 66 (1963). 
428
 Mohamed Shawki , Equitable and Reasonable Utilization of International River in the UN Convention with a 
Particular Reference to the Nile River, African Perspective, Egyptian State Information Center, 27 (2013), available 
at http://www.sis.gov.eg/newvr/afaken39/5.pdf. 
429
 Mohamed Shawki , Supra note 428. 
55 
 
the colonial era with the Basin States. These agreements gave Egypt a veto power over the 
utilization of the Nile River.
430
 For example, in 1891,
431
 the government of Great Britain, as a 
representative of Egypt, and Italy signed the Protocol of the Demarcation of their Respective 
Spheres of Influence in East Africa; by virtue of this protocol, Italy agreed not to construct on the 
Atbara River any irrigation or other construction that would modify or affect its flow into the 
Nile which is directed to Egypt.
432
 And, in 1902,
433
 the King of Great Britain Edward VII acting 
for Egypt and Sudan and the Ethiopian Emperor Menelik II  and Italy signed a treaty regarding 
the Blue Nile, Lake Tana, and the Sobat River during their determination of the boundaries 
between Ethiopia and Sudan called “ the Delimitation of the Frontier between Ethiopia and 
Sudan.”434By virtue of this agreement, Ethiopia agreed not to construct any dams over Nile River  
without obtaining the consent of Great Britain.
435
  
Further, in 1925,
436
 in exchanged notes between Great Britain acting for Egypt and Sudan 
and Italy to support Italy in constructing a railroad from Eriteria to the Italian Somali and passing 
through Ethiopia and the vicinity of Addis Ababa, Italy agreed on the “prior hydraulic rights”437 
of Egypt over the Blue Nile and White Nile or their tributaries.
438
 In 1929,
439
 Great Britain acting 
for Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzanika exchanged notes with Egypt
440
 assuring not to             
“infringe Egypt`s natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its requirement of 
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agricultural extension.”441 By virtue of these exchanged notes, Egypt prevented the Ethiopian 
authority from building a dam on the Lake Tana in 1935.
442
 In 1959, because of the excessive 
need of Egypt for development, especially after its independence from Britain, and need to 
provide water for agriculture, and its plan to build the Aswan Dam, Egypt concluded an 
agreement with Sudan to obtain its approval on the Aswan Dam. By virtue of this agreement, 
both Egypt and Sudan agreed to allocate the flow of water on their territories. Egypt had a fixed 
amount of water estimated to be 55.5 bcm ,and Sudan has the right to have 18.5 bcm as long as 
the Nile yield remains the same.
443
  
Egypt also argues that this veto power is approved by Ethiopia after its independence.
444
 
On July 1
st
  1993, Ethiopia agreed with Egypt to cooperate in utilizing the Nile River based on 
the rules and principles of international law, Article 4 in the Convention Framework for General 
Cooperation between the Arab Republic of Egypt and Ethiopia.
445
 The significance of this 
Convention, in my  view, is the agreement with Ethiopia not to initiate any project related to the 
Nile River. Moreover, by virtue of this convention, Ethiopia agreed not to undertake any project 
for development without Egyptian consent and cooperation on the project.  
 Egypt argues that all these agreements which were signed during colonial era are still 
valid,
446
  and any unilateral termination threatens its acquired right. Egypt asserts that the 
principles of the international customary law impose on the states obligation to respect their 
signed treaties and interpretation should be done in good faith. This compulsory nature can be 
understood within Articles 11 and 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
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Respect of Treaties.447 According to these articles, treaties on border or regional as well as 
geographical conditions shall not be affected by the succession of state and shall apply on 
successor state.
448
 Thus, the colonial treaties cannot be cancelled or amended unless the 
concerned state approves on such.
449
  According to the ICJ on its judgment in the case Hungary- 
Solvakia , 
450
  the regional treaties cannot be breached as a result of international inheritance; in 
addition, it may raise the state responsibility.
451
 To illustrate, such international treaties are 
inherited from the predecessor to the successor state and cannot be breached.
452
 These colonial 
treaties are obligatory on Egypt and Ethiopia as they ratified the 1978 Vienna Convention on 17
th
 
of July 1986, and on 28
th
 of May 1980 respectively without any reservation.
453
  
Egypt argued that these colonial treaties promote protection of its acquired right on 
utilizing the Nile River for a long time ago.454 It contented that it has established its prosperities 
on the banks of the Nile River since ancient times,
455
 and it is completely dependent on the Nile 
River.
456
 Egypt assured that it exercises its historical right and its utilization from water for a 
long time without objection from any riparian country; as a result, upstream countries oppose its 
utilization.
457
 This argument is concluded from  the ICJ in its judgment on a Fisheries  case 
between United Kingdom V. Norway. According to the court, it stated: 
The general toleration of foreign States with regard to the Norwegian practice 
is an unchallenged fact. For a period of more than sixty years the United 
Kingdom Government itself in no way contested it … the method of straight 
lines, established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the peculiar 
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geography of the Norwegian coast ; that even before the dispute arose, this 
method had been consolidated by a constant and sufficiently long practice, in 
the face of which the attitude of governments bears witness to the fact that they 
did not consider it to be contrary to international  law.
458
 
 Egypt asserted that this acquired right is considered its existing usage which is one of the 
criteria to measure the equitable utilization of water;
459
 in addition, the customary international 
water law imposes other principles that protect its right.
460
  In fact, this law imposed on basin 
states to use water in an equitable and reasonable manner without causing significant harm to 
each other. This is achieved by notifying the planned measure and the consent of the affected 
state.
461
 In fact, any project undertaken by the upstream countries, especially Ethiopia, will affect 
the interest of Egypt and may cause significant harm.
462
 Egypt argues that significant harm can 
be caused if there is interference or prevention of the equitable utilization;
463
 this analysis is also 
included in the ILA `s commentary on the 1966 Helsinki rules.
464
 Factually, Egypt is completely 
dependent on the Nile River;
465
 as a result, any interference to Egypt`s usage affect the human 
needs of its population for water which has priority over any other uses.
466
    
On the other hand, Ethiopia  argues that all colonial agreements are not valid 
467
 because 
Ethiopia signed under political and military power and not under freewill.
468
Ethiopia insisted that 
all previous exchanges and agreements, excepting the Convention of 1993, did not represent any 
obligation on its part.
469
  Ethiopia argues that the convention of 1902 between Great Britain and 
Ethiopia was never ratified,
470
 and the 1925 and 1929 notes exchanged between Egypt and Great 
Britain, signed them alone with the colonist.
471
 Also, these agreement deny the natural right of 
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upstream countries especially Ethiopia; however, Egypt demands its natural and acquired 
right.
472
 According to the Ethiopian argument, Egypt only benefits from these agreements.
473
 
Ethiopia considers those agreements as not reflecting their need for development.
474
 It argues 
that it’s a vital need for development475  and is not the same during colonial arena which is 
considered as a rebus sic status. As a result, Ethiopia has a right to terminate all these 
agreements.
476
 Ethiopia argues that as a sovereign state, it cannot accept colonial agreement.
477
 
and it has a right to exploit its natural resources. It argues that its vital need for water is jus 
cogens principle which precede any agreement.
478
  
Concerning the 1959 agreement, Ethiopia claims that both Egypt and Sudan did not have 
the right to allocate any share of water without the consent of other riparian countries
479
 although 
there is no harm to them.
480
 In addition, Ethiopia argues that it expressed many times its 
objection and reservation to this agreement.
481
 Ethiopia declared at that time also that it is a 
sovereign state and it has its right to use its water resources.
482
 
Ethiopia argues that equitable utilization does not mean an equal portion of water.
483
 It 
argues that Egypt has no right to oppose any water project on Blue River unless it cause 
significant harm.
484
 Ethiopia argues that the project will not cause significant harm;
485
 however, 
it benefits upstream and downstream countries.
486
 Actually, the main problem to Egypt and 
Sudan is related to their misuse of river water and climate change.
487
 Although Ethiopia is the 
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source of water to Blue River, it never claimed monopoly over it. However, its utilization limited 
compared to Egypt usage. Also, Egypt tries to maintain status quo over Ethiopia by colonial 
agreements.  
          Both countries - Egypt and Ethiopia - abstained from voting on the 1997 U.N. Covenant 
on the Law of Non- Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. Egypt insisted on its 
historical right, and its usage of the Nile River being equitable because it has no other source of 
fresh water. Moreover, it considers any changes to the current flow as causing significant harm. 
Ethiopia considers equitable use depending on the size of the population which is relatively high, 
and it has the right to use its natural source in development. Moreover, for Ethiopia, the no harm 
principle applies only to exceeding equitable usage levels.
488
  
           To understand more about their insistence on their legal argument, Egypt refused to sign 
the Agreement on the Nile River Cooperative Framework (CFA). Upstream countries refused to 
integrate the duty to notify by the planned measure in this treaty upon Ethiopia`s request.
489
 
Moreover, the upstream countries refused to integrate the historical and natural right of Egypt 
over the Nile River as a support to Ethiopia.
490
 Also, the upstream countries reject   the Egyptian 
request concerning any amendment to the agreement being accepted by the consensus, or a 
majority that includes both Egypt and Sudan.
491
 As a result, Egypt refused to sign this treaty 
because the upstream countries Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Burundi signed 
without completing the negotiation with Egypt and Sudan over these issues.  Sudan refused 
because the 1959 treaty stated that Egypt and Sudan should have the same vision concerning the 
utilization of the Nile River.   
D. Negotiation development:           
The negotiation process between Egypt and Ethiopia is a reflection of their different perspectives 
on the impact of the Dam. During the negotiation process from 2011 to 2016, the main struggle 
is how to prove the impact of the Dam on Egypt to determine whether the Dam causes 
significant harm to Egypt or not. This problem is related to fact -finding. To elaborate, after 
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several official diplomatic meetings between Egyptian, Sudanese and Ethiopian governments in 
September 2011,
492
 Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to establish a committee named the 
International Panel of Experts (IPOE). This Committee is composed of two national members 
from Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia in addition to four international experts.
493
 The main aim of this 
Committee is to explore the effects of the GERDP on downstream countries and any associated 
benefits to be expected.
494
By the end of May 2013, the final report of this Committee was 
issued.
495
  
Actually, the Committee failed to determine the impact of the GERD because the 
Ethiopian government did not have enough information.
496
 According to the report, Ethiopia sent 
the primary design which is changed during actual work.
497
 To illustrate, the feature of the  
Saddle Dam was changed from a rockfill dam with a central clay core to a rockfill dam with a 
bituminous surface sealing. 
498
 Also, the Committee realized that the level of security regarding 
the Dam is not good for construction fearing from soil sliding;
499
 as a result, the structure of the 
dam should be further studied and clarified. 
500
 Basing on geotechnical and geological finding, 
the committee noted that the interaction between the Dam, abutments and excavation of the 
power house is unclear and needs further studies.
501
 The Committee elaborated that the structure 
of the Dam does not take into account the effect of climate change
502
 and the estimated amount 
water which may losses by evaporation.
503
 Further, there was a possible harm to Egypt because 
of its demand for water especially for hydropower generation. 
504
 According to the report, the 
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capacity of the Aswan Dam will be affected by 6 % due to the general lower water level for a 
minimum of 15 years.
505
  
As a response, Egypt demanded that Ethiopia update its studies on the structural integrity 
of the Dam and give it detailed plans for the Dam,
506
 while Ethiopia argued that the Committee 
did not find any significant harm to Egypt.
507
 Between February to March 2015, the tripartite 
committee which includes from Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan received several offers from 
international firms to assess the possible effect of the Dam, and agreed on an offer from a French 
and Dutch consulting firm.
508
 However, the Dutch firm withdrew because of the incomplete 
studies concerning the construction of the Dam and conflict on how to assess the Dam.
509
 From 
November 2013 to January 2014, the three countries continued in their discussion to establish 
another Committee to follow up on the implementation of the IPOE`s recommendation.
510
 
During this discussion, Egypt proposed including international experts and to follow up the 
construction of the dam, but Ethiopia rejected this suggestion to escape from any international 
obligation.
511
 During this period, the parties allowed the participation of another French office 
instead of the Dutch firm which withdrew from assessing the impact of the Dam on downstream 
countries. Also, the parties announced that the French firm would begin its assessment February 
2016.
512
 However, the Egyptian officials are skeptical and announced “we are still facing a great 
dilemma to comply with the studies` recommendation, which may be difficult to implement after 
the Dam is complete and operating”513 
  During negotiations, Egypt has tried to eliminate any threat to its national security and 
national interest. Furthermore, it has tried to safeguard its acquired and historical right. After the 
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Committee issued its report, Egypt proposed conducting a transboundary social, economic and 
environmental assessment.
514
 It called on Ethiopia to sign the document Principles of Confidence 
Building .
515
  On March 23, 2015, the presidents of the three states signed an agreement based on 
several principles. These principles are typically imposed by the International Customary Law on 
Water Disputes, for example the duty of equitable and reasonable utilization, the existing usage,  
not to cause significant harm, the right to sustainable development, and to cooperate in good 
faith.
516
 Egypt incorporated also some principles that are closely related to the operation and 
construction of the Dam. For example, the Dam is to generate electricity only,
517
 and the 
downstream countries Egypt and Sudan have priority to purchase this electricity.
518
 Egypt insists 
also on incorporating an article on Ethiopia based on accepting the final report of the Technical 
National Committee (TNC) of the joint studies recommended by IPOE.
519
 Further, Egypt 
integrated an article that Ethiopia should cooperate in the first filling and annual operation of the 
Dam.
520
 On December 2015, the foreign ministers of the three states met to discuss ways to 
speed up the required assessment of  the Dam which was recommended by the IPOE in May 
2013.
521
 In this meeting, Egypt proposed a number of items which can be considered as a basis 
for settling this dispute. Ethiopia increases the number of gates that control the flow of 
waters.
522
The reason is because Egypt needs to secure the entire daily flow in case of any 
malfunction or the need to maintain the main gates.
523
 Another proposal is the period of filling 
the reservoir of the dam may increase up to 11 years or the amount of stored water decreasing 
from 74 bcm  to 50 bcm.
524
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On the counter part, during the negotiation, Ethiopia tried to impose on Egypt a status 
quo by justifying its argument on national sovereignty. It began when Ethiopia announced that it 
would construct the Dam without prior notification or consent of downstream countries 
especially Egypt. During the work of the IPOE, it refused to submit the actual design of the dam 
to the Committee.
525
 Ethiopia said that any further studies wanted by the Egyptian Government 
could be undertaken by Ethiopia.
526 Ethiopia feared that Egypt may go to war; as a result, it 
increased its military budget after the revolution of 30 June 2013.
527
 On June 2014, in a unilateral 
action, Ethiopia changed the course of Blue Nile.
528
 In violation of the 2015 agreement, on 
January 2016, the Ethiopian Ministry of Water Irrigation and Electricity announced unilaterally  
that the reservoir  would begin to store at least 3 billion cubic meters to test the safety of the 
dam, and refused all Egyptian proposals suggested during the December 2015 meeting.
529
 He 
announced also that only two water outlet would provide suitable water to Egypt and Sudan.
530
 
He also declared that the structural design of the Dam would not be changed under any 
circumstances.
531
 Moreover, Ethiopia refused to give Egypt the detailed plans for signing the 
Nile Basin`s Cooperative Framework which does not include the notification of the planned 
measure.
532
 On the same date in December 2015, Ethiopia decided to continue constructing the 
dam and diverted the Blue Nile in unilateral action.
533
 It also announced that the dam would 
begin to operate in 2017.   
            During negotiations, Sudan has no clear position. At the beginning of the dispute, it 
announced that the construction of the Dam would cause it significant harm;
534
 as a result, it 
participated in the tributary committee. During negotiations, Ethiopia and Sudan signed a 
military cooperation agreement;
535
 equally important, on December 4, 2013, Sudan accepted the 
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construction of the Dam because it would benefit from the electricity generated,
536
 in violation of 
the 1959 treaty. On February 18, 2014, the Foreign Minister of Sudan announced that Sudan was 
a neutral party in this negotiation.
537
However, on June 2014, it accepted the Ethiopian decision 
to change the course of the  Blue Nile.
538
  
In fact, the circumstance that surround the negotiation process is similar to that between 
India and Pakistan before the intervention of the World Bank. In the India and Pakistan dispute, 
the two parties insisted on their water usage without taking into account the interest of the other 
party. Both states signed the Delhi Agreement; however, neither India nor Pakistan respected the 
agreement because of the absence of a fact- finding process. Concerning the Egyptian and 
Ethiopian dispute, although the parties signed an agreement to settle this dispute, the main 
conflict remained unsettled. Egypt insists on its historical right. While, Ethiopia is not convinced 
by the duty of notification of planned measures and cooperation to narrow the gap.  Each party 
insists on its interest without taking into consideration the interests of the other party. Both Egypt 
and Ethiopia compete with each other on the utilization of the water of the Nile River; thus, 
settling this dispute is very important to the stability of the region. Also, the two parties ignore 
the creation of South Sudan and its independence from Sudan. South Sudan becomes a 
independent downstream country that has natural right from the entire flow of the Nile River. In 
fact, its creation may raise several question towards the historical and acquired right of Egypt; 
also, it will create more pressure on the utilization of the Nile River.
539
 In fact, this argument 
leads us to the outcome of this dispute. To illustrate, does mediation settle the Egyptian and 
Ethiopian water dispute.  
E.Outcomes:  
Egypt and Ethiopia have the will to cooperate because they understand the consequences of 
violating international water law; however, the two counties have differences because a conflict 
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of interest and their political insistence on imposing a different status quo. They have tried to 
justify their political view by legalizing it. Although Egypt and Ethiopia signed the 2015 
agreement which integrated most of the principles imposed by the customary international water 
law, they continue to insist on their position. Ethiopia insists that it has absolute territorial 
sovereignty in constructing  the water project.
540
 According to Ana Cascao , “Ethiopia’s major 
goal is a change of status quo”541 This can be seen in  its continuation to construct the Dam 
without any consent from Egypt although it declared that the construction of this Dam can cause 
significant harm to Egypt. On the other hand, Egypt insists on its historical right and it never 
called on Ethiopia to complete their negotiation over the CFA agreement.  
Actually, in my point of view, the main dispute concerns how to prove that the operation 
of the Dam is an equitable and reasonable utilization of the Blue Nile ,or whether its operation 
will cause significant harm to downstream countries. Consequently, this dispute is closely related 
to the evaluation of the impact of the features of the dam. There is a fact finding problem. One 
reason beyond is the conflict of interest, and the failure to reach an acceptable method for how to 
assess the dam from the time of signing this agreement till now.
542
 Ethiopia is technically  weak 
to carry out feasibility studies about such a mega project because it faces many technical 
challenges. One of them is lack of expertise in parallel to its weakness in knowledge about river 
management which is seen in the IPOE`s report.
543
 
To be fair, there is an economic problem in the three countries, and they do not have the 
recources to implement any action plan.
544
Ethiopia is a poor country that is unable to fund this 
mega project; at the same time, international organizations refuse to lend it money to construct 
the Dam because of Egyptian protest. As a result, there have not been full studies about the 
project which is clear from Ethiopian `s abstaining from giving Egypt an assessment for the 
Dam. In fact, Ethiopia has domestic economic and political problems which discourage foreign 
investment to fund this project. Even, if it received foreign assistance, it still needs to feed its 
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population first.
545
 Equally in importance, Egypt and Sudan are poor countries and not able to 
help Ethiopia in assessing the Dam especially with the presence of  the conflict of interest. To 
sum up, the three countries face severe challenges in meeting the demands of their population.
546
  
This dispute is further complicated because there is no neutral party that is able to narrow 
the gap between the two states. Sudan is not a neutral party and cannot play a role in resolving 
this dispute. During the negotiation process on December 4, 2013, Sudan accepted the Dam as it 
was proposed by Ethiopia.
547
 The reason is that Ethiopia offered economic incentives to 
Sudan,
548
 for example, the agreement to establish railways projects and free trade zones.
549
 Also, 
the Sudanese President announced that this Dam would benefit Sudan directly and indirectly 
because the Dam would supply Sudan with electricity after construction and would increase the 
capacity of the Sudanese hydropower project. As a result, Sudan is unable to play the role of 
mediator to narrow the gap between Egypt and Sudan,
550
 especially because of the fact that such 
acceptance violates its obligation under the 1959 Treaty with Egypt. Consequently, Egypt  a 
mistrust the Sudanese role.   
Thus, this dispute cannot be settled by mediation unless these obstacles can be solved 
through the inclusion of a neutral international organization, for example the World Bank, 
UNDP, or African Union. In fact, these international organizations have the expertise, trust, 
funds, and power to narrow the gap between the two states by using different methods.  
 Taking the World Bank as an example, the World Bank has a considerable expertise in 
settling water disputes.
551
 Its policy is based on the cooperation and goodwill of the riparian state 
for the efficient utilization and protection of the waterway. It is up to the borrower state to notify 
the affected state with complete technical information about the funded project within a 
reasonable period of time. If the interested state does not notify the affected state, the Bank does 
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so on its behalf. If the affected state objected and proved that the funded project can cause 
significant harm, the Bank establishes a committee to prove such and suggest a technical solution 
to eliminate such harm. In addition, the Bank tries on its behalf to narrow the gap between the 
interested and affected state. If the Bank fails in narrowing this gap, the Bank refuses to fund 
such a project.
552
  
During this process, the Bank plays a neutral and an unbiased role between the parties, 
and it never interferes in the politics of the states. According to article I of its charter, the Bank 
has a duty to assist in the reconstruction and development of countries, to promote long – range 
balanced growth of international trade, to arrange loans, and to conduct its operation according to 
international investment.
553
 In fact, one of the World Bank properties, according to article IV 
section 10, is prohibited  from interfering in the politics  of any member.
554
 Also, the World 
Bank has the juridical personality to contract, acquire properties, and institute legal proceedings, 
according to article VII section 2 of its Charter.
555
 Practically, parties will not fear from its 
interference because dominant countries like United States, which contributes 27.79% of the 
total contributions, has only 25% of the voting power to approve a loan to the project.
556
 
Practically, the Bank succeeded in the Indus River. Also, the Bank played a great role in 
launching the Nile Basin Initiative (NPI) in 1999 to enhance cooperation between the basin 
states
557
 and to establish the Nile Basin Fund to finance water management projects.  
Other arguments have risen that the World Bank cannot play such a role in the Egyptian 
Ethiopian water dispute because the Bank already had failed for 15 years to narrow the gap 
among the Nile Basin states and lead them to sign the CFA.
558
 Nevertheless, in my opinion, the 
basis of his argument over CFA is currently diminished because both states Egypt and Ethiopia 
signed the 2015 agreement which is typically similar in its contents to the CFA and the 1997 UN 
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Convention. Consequently, they do not differ in the CFA objective rules, except the article which 
is related to the amendment of it.  
Actually, the World Bank is an expert in solving water disputes even when      
complicated ,for example, the Indus dispute because the Bank used different techniques 
beginning from fact - finding to afford funds as an economic incentive to narrow the gap 
between the disputants. However, the World Bank will not succeed unless it uses the same 
techniques that were followed in Indus Dispute and take the underlying reasons for the dispute 
under its supervision.  
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VI.Conclusion:  
Customary international water law  obligates basin states to use river water in an equitable and 
reasonable manner without causing significant harm to other basin states. These obligations are 
established by taking into account all of the interests of basin states, and their right to pursue 
sustainable development. In fact, the substantive rules of Customary international water law  
complement each other, and are efficient in settling water disputes. It requires that basin states 
cooperate in good faith. In the event of conflict, they should resolve their disputes by using 
peaceful means. The main problem in settling water disputes is not related to the rules 
themselves which are applied; rather, it is related to fact finding, conflicts of interest between the 
disputants, and the politicizing of the dispute. Due to the problematic nature of water disputes, 
mediation plays a key role in settling such disputes because the mediator is capable of narrowing 
the gap between disputants and reducing the tension between them. This role is successful, for 
example, when a neutral international organization intervenes in the dispute because it has the 
power, expertise, and funds to settle water disputes even if they are complex. This can be seen in 
the World Banks’ settlement of the Indus River dispute between India and Pakistan. Its absence 
can be seen in the ongoing dispute between Ethiopia and Egypt on the GERD.  
 
 
